Hans Jonas and Vasily Grossman: Reflections on the Human Condition after Auschwitz by Tibaldeo, Roberto Franzini




Hans Jonas and Vasily Grossman: Reflections 
on the Human Condition after Auschwitz 
Roberto	  Franzini	  Tibaldeo	  (Scuola	  Superiore	  Sant’Anna	  –	  Pisa)1	  
1. A biographical Introduction 
1.1 Hans Jonas Hans	   Jonas	   (1903—1993)2	   was	   trained	   as	   a	   philosopher	   in	   Freiburg	   and	  Marburg	  with	  Edmund	  Husserl,	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  and	  Rudolph	  Bultmann.	  He	  received	  his	  PhD	  in	  1928	  with	  a	  dissertation	  on	  The	  Concept	  of	  Gnosis	   (Jonas	  1930),	  as	  an	  anticipation	  of	  a	  broader	  research	  then	  to	  be	  published	  in	  Gnosis	  
and	   the	   Spirit	   of	   Late	   Antiquity	   (Jonas	   1934;	   1954).	   His	   promising	   academic	  career	   was	   interrupted	   by	   Hitler’s	  Machtergreifung	   in	   1933.	   The	   very	   same	  year	  Jonas,	  who	  at	  that	  time	  was	  a	  fervent	  Zionist,	  decided	  to	  leave	  Germany,	  whereas	  his	  parents	  and	  his	  brother	  Georg	  decided	  to	  stay.	  From	  1935	  Hans	  established	  himself	   in	   Palestine.	   Jonas’	   father	   died	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   1938,	  and	  in	  that	  same	  year,	  during	  the	  Krystallnacht	  (9-­‐10	  November	  1938),	  Georg	  was	   caught	   by	   the	   Nazis	   and	   interned	   as	   a	   prisoner	   in	   Dachau.	   This	   event	  interrupted	  Jonas’	  mother’s	  arrangements	  for	  their	  departure	  from	  Germany:	  she	  wanted	  to	  obtain	  a	  visa	  for	  her	  son	  Georg,	  first.	  However,	  she	  failed.	  What	  she	   succeeded	   in	   achieving	  was	   the	  permission	   that	  Georg	   left	   for	  Palestine,	  but	  on	  condition	  that	  she	  handed	  over	  her	  own	  visa	  to	  her	  son.	  Hans	  tried	  to	  obtain	   another	   visa	   for	   his	   mother	   from	   abroad,	   but	   in	   vain.	   Jonas’	   mother	  paid	   for	   her	   generosity	   and	  devotion	   to	   her	   sons	  with	   her	   own	   life,	   since	   in	  1942	  she	  was	   interned	   in	   the	  Łódź/Litzmannstadt	  ghetto	  and	   then	  deported	  to	  Auschwitz,	  where	  she	  was	  murdered.	  During	   the	   war	   Hans	   took	   up	   arms	   against	   Nazism	   by	   enrolling	   in	   the	  Jewish	  Brigade	  Group	  of	   the	  British	  Army.	  After	   the	  war	   Jonas,	  with	  his	  wife	  and	  daughter,	  strived	  to	  establish	  themselves	  in	  Palestine,	  but	  then	  decided	  to	  move	  to	  Canada	   in	  search	  of	  better	  conditions	   for	   life	  and	  more	  encouraging	  academic	   perspectives.	   Meanwhile	   Jonas	   shifted	   his	   main	   philosophical	  research	  from	  ancient	  Gnosticism	  to	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  life.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   This	   article	   is	   one	   of	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   Research	   Unit	   “Social	   Asymmetries	   and	  Political	  Inclusion:	  Concepts,	  Methods,	  and	  Policies,”	  Scuola	  Superiore	  Sant'Anna,	  Pisa	  (PRIN	   2010-­‐2011;	   Local	   Coordinator:	   Barbara	   Henry,	   National	   Coordinator:	   Laura	  Bazzicalupo).	  2	   For	   an	   autobiographical	   account,	   see	   Jonas	   (2008),	  Wiese	   (2007),	   Bonaldi	   (2009),	  Becchi	  (2010),	  and	  Hintzen	  (2012).	  





After	   publishing	   several	   articles	   on	   this	   topic,	   in	   1966	   he	   finally	   released	   a	  book	  on	  The	  Phenomenon	  of	  Life	   (Jonas	  1966).	  As	   for	  his	  academic	  career,	   in	  1955	  he	  became	  professor	  of	  philosophy	  at	   the	  Graduate	  Faculty	  of	  Political	  and	   Social	   Science	   of	   The	   New	   School	   in	   New	   York.	   During	   the	   Sixties	   and	  Seventies	   his	   research	  mainly	   focused	   on	   issues	   such	   as	   bioethics,	   ethics	   of	  technology,	   and	   environmental	   ethics.	   In	  1979	  he	  published	  his	  masterwork	  
The	  Imperative	  of	  Responsibility	  (Jonas	  1984)	  and	  in	  1985,	  the	  book	  Technique,	  
Medicine,	  and	  Ethics	  (Jonas	  1985).	  He	  devoted	  his	  last	  philosophical	  efforts	  to	  enquiries	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  God	  such	  as	  The	  Concept	  of	  God	  after	  Auschwitz:	  A	  
Jewish	  Voice	  (1987)3	  and	  Philosophical	  Enquiries	  and	  Metaphysical	  Hypotheses	  (Jonas	  1992).	  Jonas	  died	  on	  5	  February	  1993	  in	  New	  Rochelle	  (near	  New	  York)	  where	  he	  resided.	  Only	  a	  few	  days	  before	  he	  had	  been	  awarded	  the	  Nonino	  Prize	  at	  Percoto	   (Udine)	   in	   Italy,	   for	   his	   commitment	   and	   enthusiasm	   in	   fostering	  culture	  and	  philosophy.	  Jonas	  attended	  the	  ceremony	  and	  delivered	  a	  touching	  lecture	  on	  Racism	  in	  the	  Light	  of	  the	  Threat	  to	  Mankind4. 
1.2 Vasily Grossman Vasily	   Grossman	   (1905-­‐1964)	   was	   born	   in	   Berdichev	   (Ukraine)	   into	   an	  emancipated	  Jewish	  family	  and	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  traditional	  Jewish	  education.	  Berdichev	   was	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   and	   liveliest	   Jewish	   communities	   in	   the	  former	  Russian	  Empire	  until	  World	  War	   II	  when,	   in	   September	   and	  October	  1941,	  the	  Nazis	  exterminated	  about	  20,000	  to	  30,000	  Jews	  who	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  evacuate.	  Among	  these	  was	  Grossman’s	  mother.	  In	  his	  youth	  Grossman	  witnessed	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Bolshevik	  Revolution:	  the	  Civil	  War	  of	  1918-­‐1921,	  the	  famine	  of	  1920-­‐1922,	  and	  the	  peasant	  war	  of	  1919-­‐1923.	   His	   parents,	   and	   later	   Grossman	   himself,	   supported	   the	  Revolution	   as	   an	   opportunity	   for	   Jews	   to	   gain	   equality	   of	   opportunities	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  60-­‐61).	   Indeed,	  under	   the	   former	   tsarist	  domination	  Jews	   were	   not	   only	   heavily	   discriminated,	   but	   periodically	   suffered	   from	  brutal	  pogroms.	  In	  1923	  Grossman	  moved	  to	  Moscow,	   in	  order	  to	  study	  chemistry	  at	  the	  University,	   but	   he	   soon	   lost	   enthusiasm	   for	   science.	   Instead	   he	   longed	   to	  become	  a	  writer,	  but	   this	  was	  particularly	  difficult	  due	   to	  his	  poor	  economic	  conditions.	   However,	   he	   succeeded	   in	   his	   efforts:	   his	   first	   articles	   were	  published	   in	   1928	   in	   the	  Nasha	   Gazeta	   and	   the	  Pravda;	   they	   dealt	   with	   the	  economic,	   cultural,	   and	   social	   conditions	   of	   the	   Uzbekistan	   population	   and	  indirectly	  aimed	  at	  supporting	  the	  industrialisation	  process	  decreed	  by	  Stalin	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	   81).	   Indeed,	  Grossman’s	   literary	   career	  began	   in	   the	  worst	  time:	  In	  1930-­‐1932	  there	  was	  Stalin’s	  Terror	  Famine	  and	  in	  1937-­‐1938	  there	  was	  the	  Great	  Terror.	  Stalin	  was	  tightening	  his	  control	  over	  society,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  English	  translation	  published	  in	  Jonas	  (1996,	  131-­‐143).	  4	  Published	  in	  Böhler	  (1994,	  25-­‐29;	  see	  Wolters	  2013).	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the	   arts	   and	   literature	   were	   powerful	   means	   in	   order	   to	   secure	   this	   result.	  Therefore,	   Grossman	   had	   to	   engage	   a	   struggle	   to	   write	   honestly	   and	   yet	  succeed	   in	   getting	   his	   works	   published	   “without	   writing	   to	   order	   (sotsialny	  
zakaz)”	   (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  108).	  Although	   the	  cost	  was	  high,	  his	  efforts	  were	   finally	   rewarded	   and	   he	   succeeded	   in	   gaining	   public	   recognition	   as	   a	  writer.	  In	  1941	  Grossman	  volunteered	   for	   the	   front,	  where	  he	   spent	  more	   than	  1,000	  days	  as	  a	  combat	  correspondent	  for	  the	  Red	  Star	  (Krasnaya	  Zvezda),	  the	  official	  newspaper	  of	  the	  Red	  Army.	  Grossman	  covered	  the	  major	  events	  of	  the	  Eastern	  front,	  including	  the	  Battle	  of	  Moscow,	  the	  Battle	  of	  Stalingrad	  (where	  he	   experienced	   a	   unique	   fraternal	   spirit	   and	   enthusiasm	   among	   people	   of	  different	  ethnic	  backgrounds),	  the	  Battle	  of	  Kursk,	  and	  the	  Battle	  of	  Berlin.	  In	  January	  1944,	  on	  his	  way	  to	  Berlin	  with	  the	  advancing	  Red	  Army,	  he	  arrived	  in	  Berdichev	   and	   learned	   about	   the	   fate	   of	   his	  mother	   and	   thousands	   of	   other	  Jews5.	   In	   September	  1944	  Grossman	  arrived	   at	   the	   ash	   remains	  of	   the	  Nazi-­‐German	   Vernichtungslager	   of	   Treblinka,	   where	   800,000	   people	   had	   been	  murdered.	   He	   collected	   the	   first	   eyewitness	   accounts	   of	   what	   later	   became	  known	   as	   the	   Shoah	   and	   published	   a	   touching	   report:	  The	   Hell	   of	   Treblinka	  (1944)6.	  The	  year	  before	  Grossman	  had	  been	  invited	  by	  Ilya	  Ehrenburg	  to	  join	  the	   new	   Literary	   Commission,	   which	   reported	   to	   the	   Jewish	   Anti-­‐fascist	  Committee.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  Commission	  was	  to	  collect	  eyewitness	  and	  survivor	  accounts	  about	  the	  Shoah	  on	  Soviet	  soil	  and	  to	  publish	  them	  in	  The	  Black	  Book.	  Although	   originally	   the	   project	   had	   received	   Stalin’s	   approval,	   after	   the	  war	  things	   changed	   and	   the	   project	   was	   even	   suppressed	   at	   his	   own	   order7.	  Stalin’s	   reluctance	   to	   recognise	   the	  specific	   Jewish	  nature	  of	  Nazis’	   atrocities	  against	   civilians	  was	  one	  of	   the	   causes	   that	   cracked	  Grossman’s	  belief	   in	   the	  Soviet	  system8.	  After	   the	  war	  Grossman	  devoted	   himself	   to	  writing	   a	   novel	   on	   the	  war,	  whose	  title	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  Stalingrad.	  However,	  the	  book	  was	  opposed	  by	  key	   editors	   of	   Soviet	   journals	   due	   to	   political	   and	   ideological	   reasons.	  Grossman	  had	   to	   rewrite	   the	  book	   in	  depth	  and	  change	   its	   title	   to	  For	  a	   Just	  
Cause.	   He	   finally	   succeeded	   in	   having	   the	   novel	   published	   in	   1952	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Grossman’s	  account	  The	  Murder	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  Berdichev	  (composed	  in	  1944),	  in	  Ehrenburg-­‐Grossman	  (2002,	  12-­‐19).	  6	  English	  translation	  published	  in	  Grossman	  (2010,	  16-­‐162).	  7	  However,	   a	   version	   of	   the	   book	  was	   successfully	   sent	   abroad	   during	   the	  war,	   and	  finally	   published	   in	   Israel	   (1980)	   and	  USA	   (1981).	   See	  Ehrenburg-­‐Grossman	   (2002)	  and	  Garrard-­‐Garrard	  (1996,	  177	  ff.	  and	  392).	  8	   The	   other	   critical	   issues	   pointed	   out	   in	   Grossman’s	   works	   –	   issues	   that,	   indeed,	  according	  to	  Stalin	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  publicly	  discussed	  –	  were	  the	  collaboration	  of	  the	  Ukrainian	  people	  with	  the	  Nazis	  (and,	  in	  particular,	  soldiers	  who	  had	  served	  the	  Red	  Army	  and	   then	  surrendered	   to	   the	  Germans)	  and	   the	  complete	   story	  of	  Stalingrad	  –	  i.e.,	   the	   role	   played	   by	   “the	   soldiers	  who	   fought	   and	   died	   there,	   but	  whose	   sacrifice	  was	  already	  being	  set	  aside	  so	  that	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Communist	  party	  could	  take	  credit	  for	  the	  victory”	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  194;	  see	  as	  well	  Ellis	  1994).	  





journal	   Novy	   Mir	   in	   instalments.	   But	   the	   novel	   was	   savagely	   and	   officially	  attacked	  by	   the	  Pravda.	   Grossman	   started	   to	   fear	   for	  his	   own	   safety.	   Stalin’s	  death	   in	   1953	   filled	   Grossman	   with	   the	   hope	   that	   things	   might	   change.	   He	  started	  working	  on	  his	  masterpiece,	  Life	  and	  Fate,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  his	  novel	  about	  Stalingrad.	  He	  wished	  to	  tell	  more	  of	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  battle	  and	  the	  fate	  of	  Soviet	  Jews	  than	  he	  could	  do	  in	  For	  a	  Just	  Cause.	  Unfortunately,	  things	  did	  not	  change:	  not	  only	  was	  his	  novel	  denied	  publication,	  but	  on	  14	  February	  1961	  the	  KGB	  literally	  arrested	  all	  the	  manuscripts	  of	  Life	  and	  Fate.	  This	  was	  a	  devastating	   blow	   for	   Grossman,	   who	   felt	   as	   if	   he	   had	   been	   “buried	   alive”	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  263	   ff.).	  He	  died	  of	  stomach	  cancer	   in	  1964.	  Life	  and	  
Fate	  (Grossman	  2011a)	  was	  first	  published	  in	  1980	  in	  Switzerland	  thanks	  to	  a	  friend	  of	  Grossman,	  to	  whom	  he	  had	  previously	  given	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  manuscript	  to	  hide.	  The	  same	  happened	  to	  Everything	  Flows,	  which	  was	  smuggled	  abroad	  and	  published	  in	  Russian	  in	  1970	  in	  Germany	  (Grossman	  2011b).	  
2. Unde malum? Why Auschwitz? Both	  the	  lives	  and	  reflections	  of	  Hans	  Jonas	  and	  Vasily	  Grossman	  deal	  with	  the	  
Shoah	   and	   its	   dreadful	   uniqueness.	   As	   many	   other	   intellectuals,	   Jonas	   and	  Grossman	   endeavour	   to	   enquire	   into	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   Shoah.	   This	  investigation	   recalls	   of	   course	   Job’s	   question	   on	   the	   origins	   of	   evil	   (unde	  
malum?),	   but	   it	   cannot	   end	   with	   the	   answer	   traditionally	   provided,	   namely	  theodicy.	   Indeed,	   states	   Jonas,	   what	   has	   now	   to	   be	   investigated	   is	   not	   “the	  problem	  of	  imperfection	  and	  natural	  necessity	  but	  that	  of	  positive	  evil,	  which	  implies	   a	   freedom	   empowered	   by	   its	   own	   authority	   independent	   of	   that	   of	  God”	   (Jonas	   1996,	   141).	   And	   what	   we	   have	   to	   contend	   with	   at	   this	   hour	   is	  precisely	  “the	  fact	  and	  success	  of	  deliberate	  evil	  rather	  than	  the	  inflictions	  of	  the	  blind,	  natural	  causality—the	  use	  of	   the	   latter	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  responsible	  agents	  (Auschwitz	  rather	  than	  the	  earthquake	  of	  Lisbon)”	  (Jonas	  1996,	  141).	  Besides—states	  Grossman—the	  Shoah	  highlights	  a	  shocking	  uniqueness:	  what	   sounds	   utterly	   different	   is	   Auschwitz’s	   (or	   Treblinka’s)	   infernal	  distinctiveness,	  a	  feature	  for	  which	  it	   is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  due	  and	  satisfactory	  explanation:	  Today	   the	  witnesses	  have	   spoken;	   the	   stones	  and	   the	  earth	  have	  cried	   out	   aloud.	   And	   today,	   before	   the	   eyes	   of	   humanity,	   before	  the	   conscience	   of	   the	   whole	   world,	   we	   can	   walk	   step	   by	   step	  around	   each	   circle	   of	   the	   Hell	   of	   Treblinka,	   in	   comparison	   with	  which	  Dante’s	  Hell	  seems	  no	  more	  than	  an	   innocent	  game	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Satan	  (Grossman	  2010,	  123).	  	  The	   conveyor	   belt	   of	   Treblinka	   functioned	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	  beasts	   were	   able	   methodically	   to	   deprive	   human	   beings	   of	  everything	   to	  which	   they	  have	  been	  entitled,	   since	   the	  beginning	  of	   time,	  by	   the	  holy	   law	  of	   life.	  First	  people	  were	  robbed	  of	   their	  freedom,	  their	  home	  and	  their	  motherland;	  they	  were	  transported	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to	  a	  nameless	  wilderness	  in	  the	  forest.	  Then,	  on	  the	  square	  by	  the	  station,	   they	   were	   robbed	   of	   their	   belongings,	   of	   their	   personal	  letters,	   and	   of	   the	   photographs	   of	   their	   loved	   ones.	   After	   going	  through	   the	   fence,	  a	  man	  was	  robbed	  of	  his	  mother,	  his	  wife	  and	  his	   child.	   After	   he	   had	   been	   stripped	   naked,	   his	   papers	   were	  thrown	   on	   to	   a	   fire;	   he	   had	   been	   robbed	   of	   his	   name.	   He	   was	  driven	   into	  a	  corridor	  with	  a	   low	  stone	  ceiling;	  now	  he	  had	  been	  robbed	  of	  the	  sky,	  the	  stars,	  the	  wind	  and	  the	  sun.	  Then	  came	  the	  last	  act	  of	  the	  human	  tragedy—a	  human	  being	  was	  now	  in	  the	  last	  circle	   of	   the	   Hell	   that	   was	   Treblinka.	   The	   door	   of	   the	   concrete	  chamber	   slammed	   shut.	  The	  door	  was	   secured	  by	  every	  possible	  kind	  of	  fastening:	  by	  locks,	  by	  hooks,	  by	  a	  massive	  bolt.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  door	  that	  could	  be	  broken	  down	  (Grossman	  2010,	  144).	  Moreover,	   Jonas	   and	   Grossman	   are	   aware	   that	   further	   issues	   have	   to	   be	  preliminarily	  posed	  in	  order	  to	  enquire	  into	  the	  Shoah.	  Given	  that	  the	  infernal	  magnitude	  of	   the	  evil	  experienced	  at	  Auschwitz	  and	  elsewhere	   is	  unheard	  of	  and	   hardly	   believable,	   how	   can	   it	   be	   described	   and	   accounted	   for?	   How	   to	  overcome	   the	   “aporia	   of	   Auschwitz”9	   (Agamben	   1999,	   12)?	   Is	   it	   really	  possible?	  And	  finally	  why	  enquire	  into	  Auschwitz	  after	  all?	  For	  what	  purpose?	  Notwithstanding	   differences,	   for	   both	   intellectuals	   the	   Shoah	   calls	   on	  their	   duty	   to	   comment	   on	   the	   survivors’	   testimony:	   the	   more	   Auschwitz	  challenges	   human	   understanding	   and	   eventually	   risks	   being	  misinterpreted,	  the	  more	   important	   it	   is	   to	  shed	   light	  on	   it	   (Jonas);	   the	  more	   the	  memory	  of	  the	   Shoah	   risks	   being	   cancelled	   or	   forgotten,	   the	  more	   it	   has	   to	   be	   actively	  recollected	   (Grossman).	  Moreover,	   Jonas	   and	  Grossman	   seem	   to	   confirm	   the	  correctness	   of	   Agamben’s	   analysis,	   according	   to	   which	   the	   endeavour	   to	  comprehend	   the	   Shoah	   copes	   with	   an	   essential	   lacuna	   in	   the	   structure	   of	  testimony	  itself:	  At	  a	  certain	  point,	   it	  became	  clear	  that	  testimony	  contained	  at	   its	  core	   an	   essential	   lacuna;	   in	   other	   words,	   the	   survivors	   bore	  witness	   to	   something	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   bear	   witness	   to.	   As	   a	  consequence,	   commenting	   on	   survivors’	   testimony	   necessarily	  meant	   interrogating	  this	   lacuna	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  attempting	  to	  listen	  to	  it	  (Agamben	  1999,	  13)10. I	  believe	  that	  Jonas’	  and	  Grossman’s	  reflections	  on	  the	  Shoah	  and	  on	  the	  sense	  of	  its	  testimony	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  listen	  to	  “what	  is	  unsaid”	  in	  Auschwitz,	  as	  precisely	  suggested	  by	  Agamben	  (Agamben	  1999,	  14).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  “aporia	  of	  Auschwitz”	   is	  defined	  as	  follows:	  The	  truth	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  extermination	  camps	  “is	   to	   the	  same	  degree	  unimaginable,	   that	   is,	   irreducible	   to	   the	  real	   elements	   that	   constitute	   it.	   Facts	   [are] so	   real	   that,	   by	   comparison,	   nothing	   is	  truer;	  a	  reality	  that	  necessarily	  exceeds	  its	  factual	  elements”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  12;	  see	  as	  well	  Badii-­‐D’Andrea	  2014).	  10	  For	  some	  critical	  remarks	  on	  Agamben’s	  reflections,	  see:	  Fraser	  (2000)	  and	  Chare	  (2006).	  





In	   The	   Concept	   of	   God	   after	   Auschwitz	   Jonas	   recalls	   that,	   traditionally	  speaking,	   the	   Jewish	   meaning	   of	   “witness”	   indicates	   that	   “precisely	   the	  innocent	  and	  the	  just	  suffer	  the	  worst	  …	  Through	  their	  sacrifice	  shone	  the	  light	  of	  promise,	  of	  the	  final	  redemption	  by	  the	  Messiah	  to	  come”	  (Jonas	  1996,	  132-­‐133).	  However,	  Auschwitz	  marks	  an	  irretrievable	  rupture	  and	  rift:	  Nothing	  of	   this	   is	   still	   of	   use	   in	  dealing	  with	   the	   event	   for	  which	  »Auschwitz«	   has	   become	   the	   symbol.	   Not	   fidelity	   or	   infidelity,	  belief	  or	  unbelief,	  not	   guilt	   or	  punishment,	  not	   trial,	  witness	  and	  messianic	   hope,	   nay,	   not	   even	   strength	   or	  weakness,	   heroism	   or	  cowardice,	   defiance	   or	   submission	   had	   a	   place	   there.	   Of	   all	   this,	  Auschwitz,	   which	   also	   devoured	   the	   infants	   and	   babes,	   knew	  nothing;	  to	  none	  of	  it	  (with	  rarest	  exceptions)	  did	  the	  factory-­‐like	  working	  of	  its	  machine	  give	  room.	  Not	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  faith	  did	  the	  victims	  die	   (as	  did,	   after	  all,	   »Jehovah’s	  Witnesses«),	  not	  because	  of	   their	   faith	   or	   any	   self-­‐affirmed	  bend	  of	   their	   being	   as	   persons	  were	   they	   murdered.	   Dehumanization	   by	   utter	   degradation	   and	  deprivation	  preceded	   their	   dying,	   no	   glimmer	  of	   dignity	  was	   left	  to	  the	  freights	  bound	  for	  the	  final	  solution,	  hardly	  a	  trace	  of	  it	  was	  found	   in	   the	   surviving	   skeleton	   specters	   of	   the	   liberated	   camps	  (Jonas	  1996,	  133)11.	  The	  abyss	  of	  the	  Shoah,	  with	  all	  its	  spiral	  of	  dehumanisation,	  is	  something	  that	  even	   the	   most	   faithful	   accounts	   of	   eyewitnesses	   cannot	   help	   in	   bridging	   or	  fully	   understanding.	   Thus,	   what	   about	   those	   who,	   like	   Jonas,	   were	   not	  eyewitnesses,	  and	  yet	   feel	  an	  urge	  and	  responsibility	   to	   testimony?	  How	  can	  they	   succeed?	   As	   I	   shall	   try	   to	   explain	   in	   greater	   detail	   in	   the	   following	  paragraphs,	   Jonas’	   solution	   is	   to	   revisit	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   “witness,”	   along	  with	   its	   subject	   (who	   is	   the	   witness)	   and	   object	   (what	   is	   witnessed),	   as	   a	  preliminary	  step	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  renewed	  understanding	  of	  God,	  and	  this	  is	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  glimmer	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  riddle	  of	  witnessing	  the	  
Shoah.	  As	   for	   Grossman,	   his	   initial	   reaction	   to	   the	   Shoah	   highlights	   two	   core	  beliefs.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  past	  as	  the	  writer’s	  main	  duty:	  It	   is	   infinitely	   painful	   to	   read	   this.	   The	   reader	   must	   believe	   me	  when	   I	   say	   that	   it	   is	  equally	  hard	   to	  write	   it.	   “Why	  write	  about	   it	  then?”	  someone	  may	  well	  ask.	   “Why	   recall	   such	   things?.”	   It	   is	   the	  writer’s	   duty	   to	   tell	   the	   terrible	   truth,	   and	   it	   is	   a	   reader’s	   civic	  duty	   to	   learn	   this	   truth.	   To	   turn	   away,	   to	   close	   one’s	   eyes	   and	  walk	   past	   is	   to	   insult	   the	   memory	   of	   those	   who	   have	   perished.	  Only	  those	  who	  have	  learned	  the	  whole	  truth	  can	  ever	  understand	  against	   what	   kind	   of	   monster	   our	   great	   and	   holy	   Red	   Army	   has	  entered	  into	  mortal	  combat	  (Grossman	  2010,	  150).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11Similarly	  Grossman	  in	  Life	  and	  Fate:	  “When	  you	  think	  about	  new-­‐born	  babies	  being	  killed	  in	  our	  own	  lifetime,	  all	  the	  efforts	  of	  culture	  seem	  worthless”	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  362.	  See	  also	  D’Andrea-­‐Badii	  (2010)	  and	  Dries	  (2012).	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The	   last	   statement	   highlights	   Grossman’s	   second	   belief—the	   one	   that	   post-­‐war	   events	   would	   have	   brought	   him	   to	   revise	   and	   finally	   repudiate:	   the	  conviction	   that	   Soviet	   Russia	   is	   somehow	   different	   from	   Nazi-­‐Germany,	  namely	  morally	  superior	  and	  this	   is	   thanks	  to	  Communism	  and	  the	  “Spirit	  of	  Stalingrad”,	   that	   provide	   enough	   vigour	   to	   prevent	   racism	   and	   the	  discriminations	  nurtured	  by	  the	  “imperialist	  idea	  of	  exceptionalism—of	  racial,	  national	   and	   every	   other	   kind	   of	   exceptionalism”	   (Grossman	   2010,	   161).	  Initially,	   Grossman	  puts	   the	  blame	   for	   the	  Shoah	   especially	   on	  Germany	   and	  the	  “traditional	  German	  chauvinism”	  (Grossman	  2010,	  120).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  writer	  is	  also	  aware	  that	  what	  happened	  at	  Auschwitz	  and	  Treblinka	  calls	  for	  a	  more	   thorough	   analysis,	   one	   that	   addresses	   precisely	   the	   “aporia	   of	  Auschwitz”:	  Scholars,	   sociologists,	   criminologists,	   psychiatrists	   and	  philosophers—everyone	   is	   asking	   how	   all	   this	   can	   have	  happened.	   How	   indeed?	   Was	   it	   something	   organic?	   Was	   it	   a	  matter	   of	   heredity,	   upbringing,	   environment	   or	   external	  conditions?	  Was	   it	  matter	   of	   historical	   fate,	   or	   the	   criminality	   of	  the	   German	   leaders?	   Somehow	   the	   embryonic	   traits	   of	   a	   racial	  theory	   that	   sounded	   simply	   comic	   when	   expounded	   by	   the	  second–rate	   charlatan	   professors	   or	   pathetic	   provincial	  theoreticians	  of	  nineteenth-­‐century	  Germany—…	  all	  the	  nonsense	  about	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  Germans	  to	  every	  other	  race	  on	  earth,	  all	   the	   cheap	   nonsense	   that	   seemed	   so	   comical,	   such	   an	   easy	  target	   for	   journalists	   and	   humourists—all	   this,	   in	   the	   course	   of	  only	   a	   few	   years,	   ceased	   to	   seem	   merely	   infantile	   and	   was	  transformed	   into	   a	   threat	   to	  mankind.	   It	   became	   a	   deadly	   threat	  to	   human	   life	   and	   freedom	   and	   a	   source	   of	   unparalleled	   crime,	  bloodshed	  and	  suffering.	  There	  is	  much	  now	  to	  think	  about,	  much	  that	  we	  must	  try	  to	  understand	  (Grossman	  2010,	  161).	  Thus,	  as	  a	  provisional	  result	  of	  his	  meditation,	  Grossman	  states	  that:	  “It	  is	  not	  enough	  now	  to	  speak	  about	  Germany’s	  responsibility	  for	  what	  has	  happened.	  Today	  we	  need	  to	  speak	  about	  the	  responsibility	  of	  every	  nation	  in	  the	  world;	  we	  need	  to	  speak	  about	  the	  responsibility	  of	  every	  nation	  and	  every	  citizen	  for	  the	   future”	  (Grossman	  2010,	  161).	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Grossman’s	  works	  aim	  at	  fulfilling	  precisely	  this	  task.	  
3. Enquiring into the Meaning of the Shoah Auschwitz,	  Treblinka	  and	  the	  Shoah	  give	  Jonas	  and	  Grossman	  the	  opportunity	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  in-­‐depth	  investigation	  into	  the	  abyss	  of	  human	  nature.	  Despite	  reciprocal	   differences,	   their	   reflections	   deal	   with	   analogous	   topics,	   which	   I	  shall	  now	  try	  to	  single	  out	  and	  analyse	  in	  greater	  detail.	  
3.1 The vulnerability of life 





One	   of	   the	   basic	   achievements	   of	   Grossman’s	   and	   Jonas’	   reflections	   is	   the	  vulnerable	   character	   of	   life.	  What	   vulnerability	  means	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   life	   is	  something	   perishable,	   precarious,	   fragile,	   and	   exposed	   to	   uncertainty	   and	  death.	  As	  stated	  by	  Hans	  Jonas	  in	  his	  remarkable	  essay	  on	  The	  Phenomenon	  of	  
Life	  (1966):	  living	   substance,	   by	   some	   original	   act	   of	   segregation,	   has	   taken	  itself	   out	   of	   the	   general	   integration	   of	   things	   in	   the	   physical	  context,	   set	   itself	   over	   against	   the	   world,	   and	   introduced	   the	  tension	   of	   »to	   be	   or	   not	   to	   be»	   into	   the	   neutral	   assuredness	   of	  existence.	   It	   did	   so	   by	   assuming	   a	   position	   of	   hazardous	  independence	  from	  the	  very	  matter	  which	  is	  yet	  indispensable	  to	  its	  being:	  by	  divorcing	  its	  own	  identity	  from	  that	  of	  its	  temporary	  stuff,	   through	  which	   it	   is	  yet	  part	  of	   the	  common	  physical	  world.	  So	  poised,	   the	  organism	  has	   its	  being	  on	  condition	  and	  revocable	  (Jonas	  1966,	  4).	  Life	  is	  intrinsically	  precarious	  and	  uncertain;	  it	  is	  an	  effort	  whose	  reality	  “is	  at	  bottom	   continual	   crisis”	   (Jonas	   1966,	   5)	   and	   whose	   essence	   highlights	   a	  paradoxical	   relation	   to	  death:	   “Life	  carries	  death	   in	   itself,	  not	   in	   spite	  of,	  but	  because	  of,	  its	  being	  life,	  for	  of	  such	  a	  revocable,	  unassured	  kind	  is	  the	  relation	  of	  form	  and	  matter	  upon	  which	  it	  rests”	  (ibid.	  5).	  Thus,	  life	  can	  be	  understood	  as	   an	   unrestrained	   effort	   to	   prevent	   its	   own	   annihilation:	   “Intrinsically	  qualified	  by	  the	  threat	  of	  its	  negative	  it	  [=	  life]	  must	  affirm	  itself,	  and	  existence	  affirmed	  is	  existence	  as	  a	  concern”	  (ibid.	  4).	  Organic	   life	   is	  a	  risky	  adventure,	  whose	   existence	   relies	   on	   the	   accomplishment	   of	   a	   basic	   task	   (self-­‐preservation)	   thanks	  to	   the	  employ	  of	  a	  certain	  extent	  of	  power	  over	  reality.	  Life	   is	   (self-­‐)concern	   and	   action;	   in	   a	   word:	   freedom—namely,	   a	   degree	   of	  liberty	   that	   is	   by	   no	   means	   absolute,	   since	   “the	   organic	   form	   stands	   in	   a	  dialectical	  relation	  of	  needful	  freedom	  to	  matter”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  80)12. According	   to	   Jonas,	   the	   dialectical	   and	   vulnerable	   essence	   of	   life	  characterises	   all	   living	   beings,	   including	   human	   beings.	   However,	   the	  uniqueness	  of	   the	  human	  being’s	  self-­‐concern,	  action,	   freedom,	  and	  power	   is	  such	  that	  its	  consequences	  at	  a	  social	  and	  collective	  level	  have	  gained	  epochal	  relevance.	  What	  Jonas	  has	  in	  mind	  here	  is	  related	  to	  modern	  technology—an	  issue	   that	   highlights	   “an	   infinite	   forward-­‐thrust	   of	   the	   race”	   (Jonas	   1984,	   9)	  and	  whose	   development	   risks	   to	   degenerate,	   due	   to	   “an	   excess	   of	   power	   to	  »do«	   and	   thus	   an	   excess	   of	   offers	   for	   doing”	   (Jonas	   1974,	   181)	   and	   to	   an	  unrestrainable	   tendency	   to	   “the	   cumulative	   self-­‐propagation	  of	   the	   technical	  change	  of	  the	  world”	  (Jonas	  1984,	  7;	  see	  also	  Frogneux	  2012)13.	  According	  to	  Jonas,	  these	  features	  emphasise	  a	  core	  difference	  between	  the	  present	  age	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	   On	   Jonas’	   philosophical	   biology,	   see	   among	   others	   Frogneux	   (2001)	   and	   Franzini	  Tibaldeo	  (2009).	  13	  For	  an	  interesting	  reflection	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  modernity,	  technology	  and	  the	  Shoah	  see:	  Dries	  (2012).	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the	   traditional	   framework:	   nowadays,	   an	   undeniable	   fact	   has	   come	   to	   light;	  that	  is:	  the	   critical	   vulnerability	   of	   nature	   to	   man’s	   technological	  intervention—unsuspected	   before	   it	   began	   to	   show	   itself	   in	  damage	  already	  done.	  This	  discovery	  …	  alters	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  ourselves	   as	   a	   causal	   agency	   in	   the	   larger	   scheme	   of	   things.	   It	  brings	   to	   light,	   through	   the	   effects,	   that	   the	   nature	   of	   human	  action	  has	  de	  facto	  changed,	  and	  that	  an	  object	  of	  an	  entirely	  new	  order—no	  less	  than	  the	  whole	  biosphere	  of	  the	  planet—has	  been	  added	   to	  what	  we	  must	  be	   responsible	   for	  because	  of	  our	  power	  over	  it	  (Jonas	  1984,	  6-­‐7).	  The	   “critical	  vulnerability	  of	  nature”	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	  eloquent	  signs	  of	   the	  times,	  whereas	  once	  the	  basic	  belief	  was	  exactly	  the	  opposite:	  The	   immunity	   of	   the	   whole,	   untroubled	   in	   its	   depth	   by	   the	  importunities	  of	  man,	  that	  is,	  the	  essential	  immutability	  of	  Nature	  as	   the	   cosmic	   order,	   was	   indeed	   the	   backdrop	   to	   all	   of	   mortal	  man’s	   enterprises,	   including	   his	   intrusions	   into	   that	   order	   itself.	  Man’s	   life	  was	  played	  out	  between	   the	  abiding	  and	   the	  changing:	  the	  abiding	  was	  Nature,	  the	  changing	  his	  own	  works	  (Jonas	  1984,	  3).	  In	   these	   reflections	   on	  modern	   technology	   “also	   the	   spectres	   of	   Auschwitz”	  plays	  its	  part	  (Jonas	  1996,	  134).	  The	  altered	  nature	  of	  human	  action	  not	  only	  generates	  consequences	  in	  terms	  of	  environmental	  threats,	  but	  also	  questions	  the	   sense	  of	   human	   liberty	   in	   itself.	  Auschwitz	   seems	   to	  pose	  precisely	   such	  issue:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  human	  being	  shares	  the	  vulnerable	  fate	  of	  life	  and	  nature,	  while	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  man	   is	   endowed	  with	   a	   power	   over	   reality	  thanks	   to	   which	   he	   can	   actively	   contribute	   to	   the	   critical	   degeneration	   of	  vulnerability,	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  through	  inconceivable	  and	  dreadful	  actions	  perpetrated	  against	  other	  human	  beings,	  as	  highlighted	  by	  the	  Shoah.	  How	  can	  we	   decipher	   this	   aporia	   between	   the	   “natural”	   vulnerability	   of	   life	   and	   the	  “critical”	  vulnerability	   fostered	  by	   the	  human	  being’s	   free	  will?	  How	  can	   this	  ambivalent	   abyss	   of	   human	   liberty	   be	   understood?	  As	  we	   shall	   see,	   tackling	  this	  problem	  forces	  Jonas	  to	  accomplish	  a	  peculiar	  enquiry	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  God.	  Vasily	   Grossman’s	   reflections	   indicate	   a	   strong	   similarity	   with	   those	   of	  Jonas.	  The	  dramatic	  experience	  of	  the	  Shoah	  stresses	  precisely	  the	  vulnerable	  feature	  of	  life:	  Leather,	   paper,	   cloth—everything	   of	   use	   to	   man	   was	   of	   use	   to	  these	  beasts.	   It	  was	  only	  the	  most	  precious	  valuable	   in	  the	  world	  —human	   life—that	   they	   trampled	   beneath	   their	   boots.	   Powerful	  minds,	  honourable	  souls,	  glorious	  childish	  eyes,	  sweet	  faces	  of	  old	  women,	  proudly	  beautiful	  girlish	  heads	  that	  nature	  had	  toiled	  age	  after	   age	   to	   fashion—all	   this,	   in	   a	   vast	   silent	   flood,	   was	  condemned	  to	  the	  abyss	  of	  non-­‐being.	  A	  few	  seconds	  was	  enough	  





to	  destroy	  what	  nature	  and	  the	  world	  had	  slowly	  shaped	   in	   life’s	  vast	  and	  tortuous	  creative	  process	  (Grossman	  2010,	  133-­‐134).	  The	   vulnerable	   value	   and	   beauty	   of	   (human)	   life	   stands	   out	   against	   the	  surroundings	  of	  (human)	  evil.	  To	  some	  extent,	  this	  contrast	  recalls	  the	  aporia	  of	  vulnerability	  experienced	  by	  Jonas.	  Grossman	  develops	  the	  issue	  through	  a	  dialogue	   between	   two	   characters	   of	   his	   masterpiece,	   Life	   and	   Fate	  (posthumously	  published	   in	  1980):	   the	  physicist	  of	  Communist	   faith,	  Dmitry	  Petrovic	   Chepyzhin,	   and	   his	   pupil	   (and	   alter	   ego	   of	   the	   author),	   Viktor	  Pavlovich	  Shtrum.	  According	  to	  the	  first,	  the	  evolution	  of	  life	  is	  a	  process	  that	  coherently,	   optimistically	   and	   infallibly	   results	   in	   the	   human	   being	   as	   the	  sovereign	  of	  the	  universe:	  In	   my	   opinion,	   life	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   freedom.	   Life	   is	   freedom.	  Freedom	   is	   the	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   life	   …	   Now,	   as	   soon	   as	  freedom	  appeared,	   it	  began	   to	  evolve.	   It	  evolved	  along	   two	   lines.	  First:	  man	  has	  more	  freedom	  than	  protozoa.	  The	  whole	  evolution	  of	   the	   living	   world	   has	   been	   a	   movement	   from	   a	   lesser	   to	   a	  greater	  degree	  of	  freedom.	  This	  is	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  evolution	  …	  And	  there’s	  a	  second,	  quantitative,	  line	  of	  evolution	  …	  The	  mass	  of	  animate	  matter	  will	   constantly	   increase	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   that	  of	  inanimate	  matter.	  The	  terrestrial	  globe	  will	  gradually	  come	  to	  life	  …	  Then	  the	  other	  planets	  will	  come	  to	  life	  …	  then	  the	  animation	  of	  inanimate	   matter	   will	   take	   place	   on	   a	   galactic	   scale.	   Inanimate	  matter	  will	   be	   transformed	   into	   free,	   living	  matter.	  The	  universe	  will	   come	   to	   life.	   Everything	   in	   the	  world	  will	   become	   alive	   and	  thus	  free.	  Freedom—life	  itself—will	  overcome	  slavery	  …	  One	  day	  man	   will	   be	   endowed	   with	   all	   the	   attributes	   of	   the	   deity—	  omnipresence,	   omnipotence	   and	   omniscience	   …	   But	   man	   won’t	  just	  stop	  there.	  After	  attaining	  equality	  with	  God,	  he	  will	  begin	  to	  solve	   the	   problems	   that	   were	   beyond	   God.	   He	   will	   establish	  communication	   with	   rational	   beings	   from	   the	   highest	   level	   of	  evolution,	   beings	   from	  another	   space	   and	   another	   time	   to	  whom	  the	  whole	  history	  of	  humanity	  seems	  merely	  a	  dim	   flicker	  …	  The	  abyss	  of	  time	  and	  space	  will	  be	  overcome.	  Man	  will	  finally	  be	  able	  to	  look	  down	  on	  God	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  690-­‐691).	  On	   the	   contrary,	   Shtrum,	   who	   believes	   there	   are	   no	   such	   grounds	   for	  optimism,	  strives	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  an	  inconvenient	  truth,	  one	  that	  neither	  under	  Stalin	  nor	  later	  on	  was	  to	  be	  particularly	  welcome:	  What	  I	   felt	  as	  I	   listened	  to	  you	  was	  not	   joy,	  but	  utter	  despair.	  We	  think	  we’re	  so	  wise	  … .	  And	  yet	  on	  this	  very	  day	  the	  Germans	  are	  slaughtering	  Jewish	  children	  and	  old	  women	  as	  though	  they	  were	  mad	  dogs.	  And	  we	  ourselves	  have	  endured	  1937	  and	  the	  horrors	  of	   collectivization	   –	   famine,	   cannibalism	   and	   the	   deportation	   of	  millions	   of	   unfortunate	   peasants…	   Once,	   everything	   seemed	  simple	   and	   clear.	   But	   these	   terrible	   losses	   and	   tragedies	   have	  confused	   everything.	   You	   say	  man	  will	   be	   able	   to	   look	   down	   on	  God	  –	  but	  what	  if	  he	  also	  becomes	  able	  to	  look	  down	  on	  the	  Devil?	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What	   if	   he	   eventually	   surpasses	   him?	   You	   say	   life	   is	   freedom.	   Is	  that	  what	   people	   in	   the	   camps	   think?	  What	   if	   the	   life	   expanding	  through	  the	  universe	  should	  use	  its	  power	  to	  create	  a	  slavery	  still	  more	   terrible	   than	   your	   slavery	   of	   inanimate	   matter?	   Do	   you	  think	   this	  man	  of	   the	   future	  will	   surpass	  Christ	   in	   his	   goodness?	  That’s	   the	  real	  question.	  How	  will	   the	  power	  of	   this	  omnipresent	  and	  omniscient	  being	  benefit	  the	  world	  if	  he	  is	  still	  endowed	  with	  our	   own	   fatuous	   self-­‐assurance	   and	   animal	   egotism?	   Our	   class	  egotism,	   our	   race	   egotism,	   our	   State	   egotism	   and	   our	   personal	  egotism?	  What	   if	   he	   transforms	   the	   whole	   world	   into	   a	   galactic	  concentration	  camp?	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  691-­‐692).	  Apart	   from	   the	   insinuation	   about	   the	   analogy	   between	   the	   Communist	   and	  Nazi	   branches	   of	   totalitarianism—an	   utterly	   uncomfortable	   reflection	   and	   a	  taboo	  when	  Grossman	  was	  composing	  Life	  and	  Fate14—what	  I	  find	  remarkable	  is	   the	   author’s	   capacity	   to	   provide	   one	   of	   the	   best	   and	   most	   convincing	  arguments	   against	   cosmic	   and	   ethic	   optimism.	   As	   already	   recalled	   by	   Jonas,	  this	   argument	   is	   related	   to	   the	   historical	   event	   of	   Auschwitz,	   along	  with	   its	  aporia.	  Grossman	  agrees	  with	  Jonas	  in	  singling	  out	  the	  twofold	  feature—which	  is	   indeed	   typically	   human—of	   power	   and	   vulnerability.	   What	   happened	   at	  Auschwitz	   provides	   enough	   evidence	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   that	   can	   prevent	  the	  human	  desire	  of	  equalling	  God	  to	  turn	  into	  something	  evil.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	   Shoah	   provides	   historical	   evidence	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   human	   nature	   and	  liberty	   are	   essentially	   ambivalent	   and	   supplies	   a	   peculiar	   insight	   into	   the	  essential	  relationship	  between	  vulnerability	  and	  ambivalence.	  An	  aspect	  Grossman	  analyses	  further	  is	  the	  one	  related	  to	  “State	  egotism”	  that	   characterises	   totalitarian	   States,	   along	   with	   their	   ambivalence	   and	  diabolic	   annihilation	   of	   vulnerability.	   The	   issue	   is	   intertwined	   with	   anti-­‐Semitism,	   which—according	   to	   Grossman—“is	   a	   measure	   of	   the	  contradictions	  yet	   to	  be	   resolved.	   It	   is	   a	  mirror	  of	   the	   failings	  of	   individuals,	  social	  structures	  and	  State	  systems.	  Tell	  me	  what	  you	  accuse	  the	  Jews	  of—I’ll	  tell	  you	  what	  you’re	  guilty	  of”	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  484).	  According	  to	  Grossman	  there	  are	  at	  least	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism:	  Firstly,	   there	   is	   a	   relatively	   harmless	   everyday	   anti-­‐Semitism.	  This	  merely	  bears	  witness	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  failures	  and	  envious	  fools.	   Secondly,	   there	   is	   social	   anti-­‐Semitism.	  This	   can	  only	   arise	  in	   democratic	   countries.	   Its	  manifestations	   are	   in	   those	   sections	  of	   the	   press	   that	   represent	   different	   reactionary	   groups,	   in	   the	  activities	  of	  these	  groups—for	  example,	  boycotts	  of	  Jewish	  labour	  and	   Jewish	  goods—and	   in	   their	   ideology	  and	  religion.	  Thirdly,	   in	  totalitarian	   countries,	   where	   society	   as	   such	   no	   longer	   exists,	  there	  can	  arise	  State	  anti-­‐Semitism.	  This	  is	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  State	  is	  looking	  for	  the	  support	  of	  fools,	  reactionaries	  and	  failures,	  that	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	   The	   analogy	   is	   especially	   developed	   in	   a	   remarkable	   dialogue	   between	   the	   Nazi	  
Obersturmbannführer	  Liss	  and	  the	  Communist	  Mikhail	  Mostovskoy	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  391-­‐403).	  See:	  Dell’Asta	  (2007)	  and	  Todorov	  (2003,	  48-­‐73).	  





is	   seeking	   to	   capitalize	  on	   the	   ignorance	  of	   the	   superstitious	  and	  the	  anger	  of	  the	  hungry	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  486-­‐487).	  Grossman	   focuses	   especially	   on	   the	   third	   level,	   which	   is	   indeed	   the	   most	  critical	   and	  vicious.	  Moreover,	   it	  highlights	   the	  State’s	  willingness	   to	  actively	  subdue	   the	   vulnerability	   and	   precariousness	   of	   individuals	   and	   groups	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  unrestrained	  power15.	  This	  project	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  following	  escalation,	  which	  cannot	  but	  end	  in	  the	  utter	  extermination	  of	  the	  vulnerable:	  The	   first	   stage	  of	  State	  anti-­‐Semitism	   is	  discrimination:	   the	  State	  limits	   the	  areas	   in	  which	   Jews	   can	   live,	   the	   choice	  of	  professions	  open	   to	   them,	   their	   right	   to	   occupy	   important	   positions,	   their	  access	   to	   higher	   education,	   and	   so	   on.	   The	   second	   stage	   is	  wholesale	  destruction.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  the	  forces	  of	  reaction	  enter	  into	   a	   fatal	   struggle	   against	   the	   forces	   of	   freedom,	   then	   anti-­‐Semitism	   becomes	   an	   ideology	   of	   Party	   and	   State—as	   happened	  with	  Fascism	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  487).	  Just	  like	  Jonas,	  what	  Grossman	  experiences	  as	  the	  result	  of	  his	  deconstructive	  enquiry	  is	  the	  unability—after	  Auschwitz—of	  those	  optimistic	  and	  rather	  dull	  views	  of	   liberty	   and	  history	   as	   events	   chiefly	   endowed	  with	   reasonableness,	  rationality,	  and	  metaphysical	  stability.	  Quite	  the	  contrary,	  the	  power	  gained	  by	  human	  beings	  has	  ended	   in	  disclosing	   the	  dreadful	  extent	  of	  human	   liberty’s	  ambivalence,	   in	   banning	   tout	   court	   from	   history	   notions	   such	   as	   rationality	  and	  stability,	  and	  in	  possibly	  subverting	  and	  distorting	  traditional	  values:	  I	   have	   seen	   the	   unshakeable	   strength	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   social	   good	  that	  was	  born	   in	  my	  own	   country.	   I	   saw	   this	   struggle	  during	   the	  period	  of	  general	  collectivization	  and	  again	  in	  1937.	  I	  saw	  people	  being	   annihilated	   in	   the	   name	   of	   an	   idea	   of	   good	   as	   fine	   and	  humane	  as	  the	   ideal	  of	  Christianity.	   I	  saw	  whole	  villages	  dying	  of	  hunger;	   I	   saw	   peasant	   children	   dying	   in	   the	   snows	   of	   Siberia;	   I	  saw	  trains	  bound	  for	  Siberia	  with	  hundreds	  and	  thousands	  of	  men	  and	  women	   from	  Moscow,	   Leningrad	   and	   every	   city	   in	   Russia—men	   and	  women	  who	   had	   been	   declared	   enemies	   of	   a	   great	   and	  bright	   idea	   of	   social	   good.	   This	   idea	   was	   something	   fine	   and	  noble—yet	   it	   killed	   some	   without	   mercy,	   crippled	   the	   lives	   of	  others,	   and	   separated	   wives	   from	   husbands	   and	   children	   from	  fathers.	  Now	  the	  horror	  of	  German	  Fascism	  has	  arisen.	  The	  air	   is	  full	  of	  the	  groans	  and	  cries	  of	  the	  condemned.	  The	  sky	  has	  turned	  black;	   the	   sun	   has	   been	   extinguished	   by	   the	   smoke	   of	   the	   gas	  ovens.	   And	   even	   these	   crimes,	   crimes	   never	   before	   seen	   in	   the	  Universe—even	   by	   Man	   on	   Earth—have	   been	   committed	   in	   the	  name	  of	  good	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  406-­‐407).	  As	   a	   further	   disturbing	   result	   of	   the	   subversion	   caused	   by	   contemporary	  totalitarianism,	   Grossman	   highlights	   the	   vanishing	   of	   guilt	   and	   personal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Grossman’s	  short	  story	  The	  Old	  Teacher	  (1943)	  provides	  a	  hint	  of	  the	  social	  effects	  of	  State	  anti-­‐Semitism	  (Grossman	  2010,	  84-­‐115;	  see	  also	  Ravenna	  2014).	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responsibility.	   A	   key	   passage	   of	   Grossman’s	   last	   novel,	   Everything	   Flows	  (composed	   from	  1955	   to	  1963),	   singles	  out	  precisely	   this	   issue.	  The	  excerpt	  refers	  to	  an	  imaginative	  trial	  against	  “four	  Judases”,	  namely	  four	  categories	  of	  informers	   and	   betrayers,	   who—according	   to	   Grossman—are	   to	   be	   held	  equally	   responsible	   for	   the	   Soviet	   totalitarianism.	   However,	   the	   reply	   of	   the	  Judases	  to	  the	  accusations	  of	  being	  personally	  involved	  in	  the	  dreadful	  events	  of	  Stalinism	  sounds	  like	  a	  complete	  discharge	  of	  their	  own	  responsibilities16:	  PROSECUTOR:	  …	  What	  do	  you	  all	   think?	  Do	  you	  really	  not	  consider	  yourselves	  in	  the	  least	  to	  blame?	  INFORMER:	  Allow	  me	   to	   reply.	   For	   all	   its	   outward	   simplicity,	   your	  question	   is,	   in	   fact,	   far	   from	   simple.	   In	   the	   first	   place,	   it	   is	  pointless.	  What	  use	   is	   it	  now	  to	  attempt	   to	   find	  out	  who	   is	  guilty	  with	  regard	  to	  crimes	  committed	  in	  the	  era	  of	  Stalin?	  That	  would	  be	   like	  emigrating	   to	   the	  moon	  and	  then	  starting	  a	   lawsuit	  about	  title	  deeds	  to	  a	  plot	  of	  land	  here	  on	  earth.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  take	  the	  line	  that	  the	  two	  eras	  are	  not	  so	  distant	  from	  each	  other	  and	  that,	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis,	   they	  stand	  “almost	  side	  by	  side”—as	  the	  poet	  said	  –	  then	  many	  other	  complexities	  arise.	  Why	  are	   you	   so	   eager	   to	   condemn	   those,	   like	   us,	   who	   are	   small	   and	  weak?	  Why	  not	  begin	  with	   the	  State?	  Why	  not	   try	   the	  State?	  Our	  sin,	   after	  all,	   is	   its	   sin	  …	  And	  please	  also	  explain	  one	  other	   thing.	  Why	   have	   you	   waited	   till	   now	   to	   raise	   these	   questions?	   You’ve	  known	   us	   all	   long	   enough.	   In	   Stalin’s	   lifetime	   you	  were	   only	   too	  glad	  to	  spend	  time	  with	  us	  …	  Yes,	   like	  us,	  you	  participated	   in	   the	  Stalin	   era.	   Why	   must	   we,	   who	   were	   participants,	   be	   judged	   by	  you,	   who	   were	   also	   participants?	   Why	   must	   you	   determine	   our	  guilt?	   Do	   you	   not	   see	  where	   the	   difficulty	   lies?	  Maybe	  we	   really	  are	  guilty,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  judge	  who	  has	  the	  moral	  right	  to	  discuss	  the	  question	  of	  guilt.	  Remember	  how	  Leo	  Tolstoy	  said	  that	  no	  one	  in	   the	   world	   is	   guilty?	   But	   in	   our	   State	   things	   are	   different:	  everyone	  is	  guilty	  –	  there	  is	  not	  one	  innocent	  person	  anywhere	  ...	  So	  is	  it	  for	  you,	  Comrade	  Prosecutor,	  to	  accuse	  us?	  Only	  the	  dead,	  only	  those	  who	  did	  not	  survive,	  have	  the	  right	  to	  judge	  us.	  But	  the	  dead	  do	  not	  ask	  questions;	  the	  dead	  are	  silent.	  So	  please	  allow	  me	  to	   answer	   your	   question	   with	   another	   question	   …	   What	   is	   the	  reason	   for	   this	   vile,	   universal	   weakness?	   Your	   weakness,	   our	  weakness,	   everyone’s	   weakness?	   This	   mass	   submissiveness?	  (Grossman	  2011b,	  1127-­‐1147).	  This	   is	   the	  plain	  outcome	  of	   the	   totalitarian	  epoch:	   the	   individuals	   and	   their	  attributes	  (personal	  freedom	  and	  responsibility,	  desires,	  cultural	  and	  religious	  diversity,	  etc.)	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  eradicated	  and	  substituted	  by	  grey,	  faceless	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  justifications	  provided	  by	  the	  Judases	  somehow	  resemble	  the	   arguments	   of	   those	   Nazi	   party	   officials	   who	  were	   actually	   prosecuted	   after	   the	  Second	  World	   War	   (see,	   for	   instance,	   Arendt	   2003,	   227	   ff.;	   Agamben	   1999,	   21-­‐24;	  Arendt	   2006,	   47	   ff.	   and	   270	   ff.;	   Wiegrefe	   2014;	   Bohr	   et	   al.	   2014;	   see	   also	  Wolters	  2004).	  This	  confirms	  once	  more	  the	  soundness	  of	  Grossman’s	  thesis	  of	  the	  similarity	  between	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  Soviet	  Russia.	  





men	  endowed	  with	  banal	   features—such	  as	  widespread	  weakness	  and	  mass	  submissiveness	  –	  and	  yet	  capable	  of	  accomplishing	  unprecedented	  evil	  in	  the	  name	   of	   “good”.	   Ambivalence	   and	   vulnerability	   undergo	   a	   similar	  deterioration:	   they	   no	   longer	   highlight	   the	   human	   being’s	   (ordinary)	  uniqueness,	   but	   are	   involved	   in	   the	   dreadful	   and	   critical	   distortions	   of	   the	  latter	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  
3.2 The immortality of humanity Although	  for	  both	  Jonas	  and	  Grossman	  the	  Shoah	  represents	  far	  more	  than	  an	  event	   among	   others	   and	   is	   a	   Stolperstein	   (stumbling	   block)	   that	   cannot	   be	  simply	   forgotten	   or	   erased,	   neither	   of	   them	   believes	   Auschwitz	   has	   the	   last	  word.	  Even	  though	  it	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  distorted	  historical	  effects	  (and	  indeed	  Auschwitz	   exemplifies	   the	   horrible	   extent	   of	   this	   falsification),	   yet	   the	  ambivalence	  of	   freedom	   is	  what	  distinguishes	   the	  human	  being	   in	   itself,	   and	  thus	   it	   cannot	   be	   simply	   disposed	   of.	   For	   both	   Jonas	   and	   Grossman	   it	   is	  inconceivable	  to	  relinquish	  human	  freedom	  only	  because	  of	  its	  faults.	  But	  how	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  ambivalence	  of	  human	  freedom	  after	  Auschwitz?	  How	  to	  deal	  with	   such	   frightful	   background	   and	  with	   the	   possibility	   of	   further	  misuse	   of	  liberty?	  And	  what	  about	   the	   related	   issue	  of	  good?	  How	   is	   it	   still	  possible	   to	  search	   for	   the	   good	   after	   Auschwitz?	  What	   transformation	   does	   that	   notion	  undergo?	   And	   what	   about	   the	   related	   belief	   shared	   by	   both	   authors	   in	  humanity’s	  immortality?	  Grossman’s	  answer	  to	  the	  issue	  regarding	  good	  is	  quite	  explicit:	  Good	   is	   to	   be	   found	  neither	   in	   the	   sermons	   of	   religious	   teachers	  and	   prophets,	   nor	   in	   the	   teachings	   of	   sociologists	   and	   popular	  leaders,	   nor	   in	   the	   ethical	   systems	   of	   philosophers…	   And	   yet	  ordinary	  people	  bear	  love	  in	  their	  hearts,	  are	  naturally	  full	  of	  love	  and	   pity	   for	   any	   living	   thing	  …	  Yes,	   as	  well	   as	   this	   terrible	   Good	  with	   a	   capital	   “G”,	   there	   is	   everyday	   human	   kindness.	   The	  kindness	  of	  an	  old	  woman	  carrying	  a	  piece	  of	  bread	  to	  a	  prisoner,	  the	   kindness	   of	   a	   soldier	   allowing	   a	   wounded	   enemy	   to	   drink	  from	   his	   water-­‐flask,	   the	   kindness	   of	   youth	   towards	   age,	   the	  kindness	  of	  a	  peasant	  hiding	  an	  old	  Jew	  in	  his	  loft.	  The	  kindness	  of	  a	   prison	   guard	   who	   risks	   his	   own	   liberty	   to	   pass	   on	   letters	  written	   by	   a	   prisoner	   not	   to	   his	   ideological	   comrades,	   but	   to	   his	  wife	  and	  mother.	  The	  private	  kindness	  of	  one	   individual	   towards	  another;	  a	  petty,	   thoughtless	  kindness;	  an	  unwitnessed	  kindness.	  Something	   we	   could	   call	   senseless	   kindness.	   A	   kindness	   outside	  any	  system	  or	  social	  or	  religious	  good.	  But	  if	  we	  think	  about	  it,	  we	  realize	   that	   this	   private,	   senseless,	   incidental	   kindness	   is	   in	   fact	  eternal	   …	   .	   Even	   at	   the	  most	   terrible	   times,	   through	   all	   the	  mad	  acts	   carried	   out	   in	   the	   name	   of	   Universal	   Good	   and	   the	   glory	   of	  States,	   time	  when	  people	  were	   tossed	  about	   like	  branches	   in	   the	  wind,	  filling	  ditches	  and	  gullies	  like	  stones	  in	  an	  avalanche	  –	  even	  then	   this	   senseless,	   pathetic	   kindness	   remained	   scattered	  throughout	  life	  like	  atoms	  of	  radium	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  407-­‐408).	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Although	   Grossman	   defines	   this	   variety	   of	   good	   as	   a	   “mad,	   blind,	   kindness”	  (Grossman	  2011a,	  409)17,	  what	  he	  hints	  at	  is	  no	  ingenuous	  or	  irenic	  belief,	  but	  a	  conviction	  that	  has	  been	  inconceivably	  corroborated	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  Shoah:	  Yes,	  after	  despairing	  of	   finding	  good	  either	   in	  God	  or	   in	  Nature,	   I	  began	   to	   despair	   even	   of	   kindness.	   But	   the	   more	   I	   saw	   of	   the	  darkness	   of	   Fascism,	   the	   more	   clearly	   I	   realized	   that	   human	  qualities	  persist	  even	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  grave,	  even	  at	  the	  door	  of	  the	  gas	  chamber.	  My	  faith	  has	  been	  tempered	  in	  Hell.	  My	  faith	  has	  emerged	   from	  the	   flames	  of	   the	  crematoria,	   from	  the	  concrete	  of	  the	  gas	  chamber.	  I	  have	  seen	  that	  it	  is	  not	  man	  who	  is	  impotent	  in	  the	  struggle	  against	  evil,	  but	  the	  power	  of	  evil	  that	  is	  impotent	  in	  the	   struggle	   against	   man.	   The	   powerlessness	   of	   kindness,	   of	  senseless	   kindness,	   is	   the	   secret	   of	   its	   immortality	   (Grossman	  2011a,	  410).	  And	   similarly	   in	  An	  Armenian	   Sketchbook	   (written	   in	   1962	   and	  published	   in	  1988)	  while	  reporting	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  former	  inmate	  of	  a	  Soviet	  gulag:	  He	   said	   a	   lot	   about	   how,	   though	   reduced	   almost	   to	   the	   level	   of	  animals,	  people	   in	  the	  camps	  still	   felt	  pity	   for	  one	  another,	  about	  how	   those	  who	  were	   on	   their	   last	   legs	   did	   all	   they	   could	   to	   help	  others	  who	  were	   on	   their	   last	   legs,	   about	   how	  neither	   blizzards,	  nor	  temperatures	  of	  minus	  forty,	  nor	  national	  differences	  ever	  got	  in	  the	  way	  of	  human	  kindness	  (Grossman	  2013,	  pos.	  756-­‐758).	  This	   basic	   faith	   in	  human	  nature	   and	   its	   immortality	   recalls	  Grossman’s	  The	  
Sistine	   Madonna	   (composed	   in	   1955,	   but	   published	   only	   in	   1989),	   a	  remarkable	  reflection	  on	  art	  and	  atrocity.	  Grossman’s	  thoughts	  originate	  from	  Raphael’s	  painting	  Sistine	  Madonna	   (1512),	  which	  he	  had	   the	  opportunity	   to	  contemplate	  in	  1955	  during	  an	  exhibition	  in	  Moscow	  at	  the	  Pushkin	  Museum	  (Grossman	   2010,	   164)18.	   The	   writer	   begins	   by	   stating	   clearly	   the	   correct	  nature	   of	   his	   considerations,	   which	   are	   by	   no	   means	   animated	   by	   a	  transcendent	  perspective	  upon	  life19:	  In	   his	   Madonna	   Raphael	   has	   revealed	   the	   mystery	   of	   maternal	  beauty.	   But	   the	   secret	   of	   the	   painting’s	   inexhaustible	   life	   lies	  elsewhere	  …	  .	  The	  Madonna’s	  beauty	  is	  closely	  tied	  to	  earthly	  life	  …	  .	  It	  is	  a	  universal	  beauty.	  This	  Madonna	  is	  the	  soul	  and	  mirror	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  For	  a	  comment	  on	  Grossman’s	  idea	  of	  kindness,	  see	  Todorov	  (2003,	  69-­‐72).	  18	   This	   and	   other	  works	   of	   art	   had	   been	   requisitioned	   by	   the	   Red	   Army	   during	   the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  were	  about	   to	  be	  returned	  to	   the	  Gemäldegalerie	   in	  Dresden	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  328).	  19	  Raphael’s	  Sistine	  Madonna	   gives	   rise	   to	  a	   lively	  debate	   in	   the	  19th	   century	  Russia.	  Among	  the	  intellectuals	  that	  take	  part	  in	  the	  discussion,	  there	  are	  F.	  Dostoyevsky	  and	  L.	  Tolstoy.	  According	  to	  the	  first,	  The	  Sistine	  Madonna	  is	  the	  sublime	  expression	  of	  an	  ideal	   mystical	   experience,	   while	   Tolstoy	   interprets	   the	   painting	   in	   mere	   immanent	  human	   terms	   (Bori	   1990;	   Curletto	   2006,	   42-­‐44;	   Mrówczyński-­‐Van	   Allen	   2013;	  Pirazzoli	  2013).	  





all	   human	   beings,	   and	   everyone	   who	   looks	   at	   her	   can	   see	   her	  humanity	   …	   .	   I	   believe	   that	   this	   Madonna	   is	   a	   purely	   atheistic	  expression	   of	   life	   and	   humanity,	   without	   divine	   participation	  (Grossman	  2010,	  165-­‐166).	  Grossman	   does	   not	   forget	   the	   dark	   shadow	   recently	   cast	   by	   the	   Shoah	   on	  history.	   He	   is	   aware	   that	   the	   Madonna’s	   beauty	   and	   humanity	   confront	  exceptionally	  hard	  times.	  Yet,	  precisely	  for	  this	  reason,	  Grossman	  believes	  that	  the	  Madonna	   is	   a	   symbol	   standing	  out	   against	   the	   adversities	  of	  history	   and	  endowed	  with	  universal	  relevance:	  “Looking	  at	  the	  Sistine	  Madonna,	  our	  own	  epoch	  glimpses	  its	  own	  fate	  …	  A	  wolfish	  time	  had	  come,	  the	  time	  of	  Fascism.	  It	  was	   a	   time	   when	   people	   led	   wolfish	   lives	   and	   wolves	   lived	   like	   people”	  (Grossman	   2010,	   168-­‐170).	   Albeit	   the	   coeval	   dark	   times,	   the	   Madonna	  witnesses	   the	   persistence	   of	   humanity	   and	   its	   thorough	   difference	   from	   in-­‐humanity,	   whose	   champions	   are	   individuals	   like	   Hitler	   and	   Stalin,	   who	   are	  explicitly	  mentioned	  by	  Grossman,	  and	  thus	  very	  much	  alike	  in	  their	  criminal	  brotherhood.20	  Neither	  Hitler	   nor	   Stalin	   are	   able	   to	   look	   into	   the	  Madonna’s	  eyes	  or	  recognise	  her	  (Grossman	  2010,	  170,	  172).	  Instead,	  “we,	  we	  people,	  we	  recognized	  her,	  and	  we	  recognized	  her	  son	  too.	  She	  is	  us;	  their	  fate	  is	  our	  own	  fate;	  mother	  and	  son	  are	  what	   is	  human	   in	  man”	   (Grossman	  2010,	  172;	  also	  Riconda	   2007	   &	  Maddalena	   2007).	   And	  what	   does	   the	  Madonna	   represent?	  What	   is	   she	   the	   symbol	   for?	   She	   symbolises	  precisely	   the	   immortality	  of	   life	  and	  humanity:	  The	  painting	  speaks	  of	  the	  joy	  of	  being	  alive	  on	  this	  earth;	  this	  too	  is	   a	   source	   of	   its	   calm,	  miraculous	   power.	   The	  whole	  world,	   the	  whole	   vast	   universe,	   is	   the	   submissive	   slavery	   of	   inanimate	  matter.	  Life	  alone	  is	  the	  miracle	  of	  freedom.	  And	  the	  painting	  also	  tells	   us	   how	   precious,	   how	   splendid	   life	   has	   to	   be,	   and	   that	   no	  force	  in	  the	  world	  can	  compel	  life	  to	  change	  into	  some	  other	  thing	  that,	  however	  it	  may	  resemble	  life,	  is	  no	  longer	  life.	  The	  power	  of	  life,	   the	  power	   of	  what	   is	   human	   in	  man,	   is	   very	   great,	   and	   even	  the	   mightiest	   and	   most	   perfect	   violence	   cannot	   enslave	   this	  power;	   it	  can	  only	  kill	   it.	  This	   is	  why	  the	   faces	  of	   the	  mother	  and	  child	   are	   so	   calm:	   they	   are	   invincible.	   Life’s	   destruction,	   even	   in	  our	  iron	  age,	  is	  not	  its	  defeat	  …	  We	  live	  in	  troubled	  time.	  Wounds	  have	  not	  yet	  healed	  …	  Over	  the	  ditches	  that	  contain	  the	  bodies	  of	  murdered	   Jewish	   children	   and	  mothers	   the	   earth	   is	   still	   shifting,	  still	   settling	   into	   place	   …	   .	   The	   Madonna	   has	   suffered	   all	   this	  together	   with	   us—for	   she	   is	   us,	   and	   her	   son	   is	   us	   (Grossman	  2010,	  172-­‐173).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	   Besides,	   as	   admitted	   by	   the	   Communist	   party	   boss	   for	   all	   ideological	   matters,	  Mikhail	   A.	   Suslov,	   in	   a	   conversation	  with	   Grossman	   held	   in	   the	   Kremlin	   on	   23	   July	  1962,	  the	  “direct	  comparisons	  between	  us	  [Soviet	  Russia]	  and	  Nazi	  Germany”	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  make	  it	  “impossible	  to	  publish	  your	  book	  [Life	  and	  Fate],	  and	  it	  will	  not	  be	  published”	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  358;	  see	  as	  well	  Grossman	  1997).	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Grossman	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Shoah	   implacably	   questions	  everybody’s	  personal	  responsibility.	  Besides,	  he	  confesses	  that	  the	  doubt	  cast	  on	  the	  impossibility	  of	  personal	  innocence	  in	  times	  of	  totalitarianism	  is	  indeed	  a	   “difficult	   and	   terrible	   question”	   (Grossman	   2010,	   173)21.	   Grossman	   is	  perfectly	   aware	   of	   his	   faults,	   nor	   does	   he	   attempt	   to	   excuse	   them22.	   He	  believes,	  however,	  that	  the	  cruel	  present	  calls	  for	  a	  higher	  task:	  We	  will	   say,	   »There	   has	   been	   no	   time	   crueller	   than	   ours,	   yet	  we	  did	  not	  allow	  what	  is	  human	  in	  man	  to	  perish«.	  Seeing	  the	  Sistine	  Madonna	   go	   on	   her	   way,	   we	   preserve	   our	   faith	   that	   life	   and	  freedom	  are	  one,	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  higher	  than	  what	  is	  human	  in	  man.	  This	  will	   live	   forever	  and	  triumph	  (Grossman	  2010,	  173-­‐174).	  In	   conclusion,	  what	  Grossman	   achieves	   from	  his	   enquiry	   into	   the	  Shoah	   is	   a	  renewed	   belief	   in	   the	   godless	   immortality	   of	   humanity,	   which	   in	   addition	  strongly	   supports	   his	   effort	   to	   actively	   recollect	   Auschwitz	   and	   Treblinka.	  However,	   the	   historical	   events	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   Soviet	   Russia	  (the	   success	  of	   Stalinisation	  and	   then	   the	  Destalinisation	  with	   its	   fallacy	  and	  false	   hope)23	   roughly	   challenge	   Grossman’s	   faith.	   While	   working	   on	   his	  masterpiece	  Life	   and	   Fate,	   the	   KGB	   arrests	   all	  materials	   related	   to	   it	   (notes,	  copies	  of	   the	  manuscript,	  even	  the	  spools	  of	  his	   typewriter,	  etc.).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	   writer	   and	   the	   truth	   he	   strived	   to	   tell	   are	   buried	   alive.	   Yet,	   these	  tribulations	  confirm	  the	  soundness	  of	  his	  faith,	  as	  highlighted	  by	  the	  following	  excerpts	  written	  by	  Grossman	   in	  his	   last	   years.	  The	   first	  dates	  back	   to	  1961	  and	  is	  addressed	  to	  his	  deceased	  mother:	  I	  am	  you,	  dear	  Mama,	  and	  as	  long	  as	  I	  live,	  then	  you	  are	  alive	  also.	  When	   I	  die,	  you	  will	   continue	   to	   live	   in	   this	  book	   [Life	  and	  Fate],	  which	  I	  have	  dedicated	  to	  you	  and	  whose	  fate	  is	  closely	  tied	  with	  your	  fate	  …	  .	  Working	  [on	  Life	  and	  Fate]	  over	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  I	  have	  been	  thinking	  about	  you	  constantly.	  My	  novel	  is	  dedicated	  to	  my	  love	  and	  devotion	  to	  people,	  and	  that	  is	  why	  it	  is	  dedicated	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  As	  already	  highlighted,	  this	  challenging	  and	  terrible	  question	  is	  at	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  noteworthy	  trial	  against	  the	  “four	  Judases”.	  The	  trial	  ends	  with	  the	  following	  verdict:	  “No	  one	  among	  the	  living	  is	  innocent.	  All	  the	  living	  are	  guilty	  …	  You,	  the	  defendant,	  are	  guilty,	  and	  you,	  the	  prosecutor,	  are	  guilty,	  and	  I,	  the	  writer—I	  who	  am	  thinking	  about	  the	  defendant,	  the	  prosecutor	  and	  the	  judge	  –	  am	  guilty”	  (Grossman	  2011b,	  pos.	  1181-­‐1184).	  22	  This	  issue	  is	  brilliantly	  developed	  in	  Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996.	  Among	  his	  wrong	  acts,	  Grossman	  particularly	   regrets	  having	   failed	   to	   save	  his	  mother	   from	  her	   fate	  during	  the	  war	  and	  having	  spent	  too	  little	  efforts	  to	  save	  some	  of	  his	  parents	  and	  friends	  from	  the	  ferocity	  of	  Stalin’s	  Terror	  in	  the	  Thirties.	  23	   See	   for	   instance	   the	   following	   statements	   pronounced	   by	   Suslov	   during	   a	  conversation	   with	   Grossman	   in	   1962:	   “We	   have	   revealed	   the	   mistakes	   that	  accompanied	   the	   cult	   of	   Stalin,	   but	   we	   will	   never	   condemn	   Stalin	   for	   fighting	   the	  enemies	  of	   the	  Communist	  party	  and	  of	   the	  state.	  We	  condemn	  him	  only	  because	  he	  waged	  war	  against	  his	  own	  people	  [i.e.,	  the	  Party	  itself]”	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  359).	  





you.	   For	  me,	   you	   are	   humanity,	   and	   your	   terrible	   fate	   is	   the	   fate	  and	  destiny	  of	  humanity	   in	   this	   inhumane	  time	  (Garrard-­‐Garrard	  1996,	  353).	  The	  second	  quotation	  belongs	  to	  Everything	  Flows:	  ...	   at	   this	   time	   of	   the	   total	   triumph	   of	   inhumanity	   it	   has	   become	  clear	  that	  everything	  created	  by	  violence	  is	  senseless	  and	  useless.	  It	   exists	  without	   a	   future;	   it	  will	   leave	   no	   trace.	   This	   is	  my	   faith	  (Grossman	  2011b,	  pos.	  3082-­‐3084).	  Finally,	  the	  third	  is	  a	  remarkable	  excerpt	  from	  Grossman’s	  personal	  testament,	  
An	   Armenian	   Sketchbook,	   written	   in	   early	   1962.	   Grossman	   is	   struck	   by	   an	  unexpected	   revelation	   while	   talking	   with	   an	   unknown	   semi-­‐literate	   old	  Armenian:	  The	   supreme	   human	   gift	   is	   beauty	   of	   soul;	   it	   is	   nobility,	  magnanimity	  and	  personal	  courage	  in	  the	  name	  of	  what	  is	  good.	  It	  is	  a	  gift	  possessed	  by	  certain	  shy,	  anonymous	  warriors,	  by	  certain	  ordinary	   soldiers	   but	   for	   whose	   exploits	   we	   would	   cease	   to	   be	  human	  (Grossman	  2013,	  pos.	  1528-­‐1530).	  Humanity	   is	   the	   common	   feature	   unifying	   all	   human	   beings,	   who	   belong	   to	  different	   cultures	   and	   nationalities.	   However,	   the	   accomplishment	   of	  humanity	   relies	   on	   the	  most	   fundamental	   of	   all	   values,	   which	   is	   (individual	  and	   collective)	   freedom:	   “Communication	   between	   people	   of	   different	  nationalities	   enriches	   human	   society	   and	   makes	   it	   more	   colourful.	   But	   this	  process	   of	   enrichment	   cannot	   take	  place	  without	   freedom.	  When	  people	   are	  free,	   communication	   between	   different	   nations	   is	   fruitful	   and	   beneficial”	  (Grossman	   2013,	   pos.	   315-­‐317).	   Then,	   Grossman	   recalls	   once	   again	   the	  vulnerability	   and	  precariousness	   of	   human	   liberty,	  which	   is	  menaced	  by	   the	  “blind	   obsession	   of	   national	   character”	   (Grossman	   2013,	   pos.	   328)	   and	   “the	  rigidity	  of	  national	  stereotypes”	  (Grossman	  2013,	  pos.	  352-­‐353).	  To	  start	  with,	  these	  threats	  have	  to	  be	  recognised	  and	  overcome,	  so	  that	  what	  is	  “more	  truly	  human”	  can	  be	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  flourish:	  ...	   what	   matters	   is	   to	   discover	   the	   riches	   of	   human	   hearts	   and	  souls;	  what	  matters	   is	   the	   human	   content	   of	   poetry	   and	   science,	  the	   universal	   charm	   and	   beauty	   of	   architecture;	  what	  matters	   is	  human	   courage	   and	   nobility	   …	   .	   It	   is	   the	   struggle	   for	   human	  spiritual	  and	  material	  wealth,	  the	  struggle	  for	  freedom	  of	  thought	  and	  expression,	  the	  struggle	  for	  a	  peasant’s	  freedom	  to	  sow	  what	  he	   wants	   to	   sow,	   for	   everyone’s	   freedom	   to	   enjoy	   the	   fruits	   of	  their	   own	   work—this	   is	   the	   true	   struggle	   for	   national	   dignity”	  (Grossman	  2013,	  pos.	  353-­‐357).	  These	   reflections	  disclose	   the	   full	   extent	   of	  Grossman’s	  humanistic	   faith	   and	  profound	  wisdom,	  which	  he	  achieved	  through	  pain	  and	  sorrow.	  As	  remarked	  by	   Emmanuel	   Lévinas,	   these	   are	   thoughts	   that	   definitely	   bear	   witness	   to	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Grossman’s	   recognition	  of	   peace	   “as	   awakeness	   to	   the	  precariousness	   of	   the	  other”	  (Lévinas	  1996,	  167).	  Let	   us	   now	   turn	   to	   Hans	   Jonas’	   reflections	   on	   immortality	   and	   its	  connection	  with	  the	  good.	  As	  anticipated	  in	  §	  3.1,	  the	  human	  being	  highlights	  a	  distinctive	  feature:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  human	  life	  and	  freedom	  are	  rooted	  within	  the	   natural	   and	   cosmic	   phenomenon	   of	   life,	   and	   share	   its	   very	   vulnerable	  essence;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  transcend	  this	  biological	  basis	  and	  succeed	  in	  amplifying	  the	  possibilities	  offered	  by	  organic	  life	  and	  freedom.	  In	  particular,	  human	   liberty	  manifests	   an	  unprecedented	  and	  ambivalent	   feature,	   one	   that	  gives	   rise	   to	   critical	   issues	   impacting	   on	   the	   very	   essence	   of	   life.	  How	   is	   the	  human	   being’s	   distinctiveness	   to	   be	   highlighted	   in	   greater	   detail?	   What	  relationship	  does	   it	  exhibit	  with	   immortality?	  What	  are	   the	  consequences	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  good?	  According	  to	  Jonas,	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  human	  being	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  Man	   models,	   experiences,	   and	   judges	   his	   own	   inner	   state	   and	  outward	   conduct	   after	   the	   image	   of	   what	   is	   man’s.	   Willingly	   or	  not	   he	   lives	   the	   idea	   of	   man—in	   agreement	   or	   in	   conflict,	   in	  acceptance	   or	   in	   defiance,	   in	   compliance	   or	   in	   repudiation,	   with	  good	  or	  with	  bad	  conscience	  (Jonas	  1966,	  185;	  Frogneux	  2012).	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  distinctiveness	  of	  human	  freedom	  is	  such,	   that	   it	  provides	   its	  owner	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   measuring	   “his	   being	   against	   terms	   that	  transcend	  the	  immediate	  situation”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  186)	  and	  even	  of	  surpassing	  the	   restraints	   of	   temporality.	   This	   is	   precisely	   what	   distinctive	   human	  enterprises	   such	   as	   religion,	   ethics,	   and	  metaphysics	   have	   in	   common:	   they	  “are	  attempts,	  never	  completed,	  to	  meet	  and	  answer	  the	  question	  [concerning	  human	   nature]	   within	   an	   interpretation	   of	   total	   reality”	   (Jonas	   1966,	   187).	  Thus,	  Jonas	  puts	  forward	  the	  following	  hypothesis	  regarding	  the	  overall	  sense	  of	  human	  liberty:	  “We	  feel,	  temporality	  cannot	  be	  the	  whole	  story,	  because	  in	  man	   it	   has	   an	   inherently	   self-­‐surpassing	   quality,	   of	   which	   the	   very	   fact	   and	  fumbling	  of	  our	  idea	  of	  eternity	  is	  a	  cryptic	  signal”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  268).	  And:	  The	  fact	  that	  by	  cosmic	  scales	  man	  is	  but	  an	  atom	  is	  a	  quantitative	  irrelevancy:	   his	   inner	   width	   can	   make	   him	   an	   event	   of	   cosmic	  importance.	   The	   reflection	   of	   being	   in	   knowledge	   may	   be	   more	  than	  a	  human	  event:	  it	  may	  be	  an	  event	  for	  being	  itself	  and	  affect	  its	   metaphysical	   condition.	   In	   Hegelian	   language:	   a	   “coming	   to	  itself”	  of	  original	  substance	  (Jonas	  1966,	  283-­‐284).	  In	   other	  words,	   Jonas	   believes	   that	   a	   thorough	   understanding	   of	   the	   human	  being’s	   uniqueness,	   along	  with	   its	   capacity	   to	   transcend	   any	   given	   situation,	  can	   be	   achieved	   only	   through	   a	   tentative	   investigation	   into	   the	   very	  fundament	  of	   transcendence	   and	   liberty,	   namely	  God.	   Indeed,	   Jonas	  believes	  that	   the	   symbol	   of	   man’s	   transcendent	   uniqueness,	   namely	   the	   “image	   of	  





man”,	  is	  precisely	  due	  to	  God,	  who	  created	  it.	  But	  what	  does	  this	  mean?	  What	  does	  “creation”	  mean	  here?	  Rather	  than	  adhering	  to	  the	  traditional	  viz.	  active	  and	  dynamic	   interpretation	  of	   the	  creative	  act24,	   Jonas	  underlines	  a	  different	  aspect,	   one	   related	   to	   God’s	   primeval	   decision	   to	   renounce	   “his	   own	   being,	  divesting	  himself	  of	  his	  deity”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  275)	  and	  omnipotence,	  and	  giving	  himself	  over	  to	  the	  chance	  and	  risk	  and	  endless	  variety	  of	  becoming25.	  In	  this	  way,	  God	  lets	  the	  cosmos	  (and	  life,	  human	  freedom,	  and	  the	  “image	  of	  man”)	  be	   and	   evolve,	   so	   that	   the	   eternal	   realm	   can	   finally	   “come	   to	   itself”	   and	  “recover	  its	  plenitude”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  275,	  284).	  However,	  the	  Creation	  yielded	  by	   God’s	   self-­‐denial	   and	   self-­‐forfeiture	   cannot	   be	   predetermined	   by	   any	  specific	   project	   or	   intelligent	   design,	   nor	   by	   any	   movement	   leading	   to	   any	  prefixed	   goal.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   created	   cosmos	   is	   characterised	   by	   utter	  contingency,	   and	   its	   future	   is	   open-­‐ended	  and	   still	   to	  be	  decided.	  This	   is	   the	  cosmos	   where	   human	   beings	   foster	   their	   ambivalent	   liberty	   and	   are	  responsible	  for	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  deeds	  (Jonas	  1966,	  278-­‐281).	  Despite	   its	   open-­‐ended	   and	   contingent	   feature,	   the	   cosmic	   being	   ought	  not	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   pure	   ethical	   indifference	   or	   ontological	  nihilism.	  As	   regards	  God,	   although	   impotent	  and	  self-­‐negated,	  he	   is	   certainly	  not	   indifferent	   to	  what	   takes	  place	  within	   the	  Creation.	   Indeed,	  he	  manifests	  worry,	  hope,	  interest	  towards	  the	  cosmos	  and	  its	  evolving	  character,	  and	  gains	  strength	   through	   its	   adventures.	   Mainly,	   this	   happens	   as	   soon	   as	   “the	   first	  stirring	  of	  life”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  275)	  appears	  along	  with	  its	  distinctive	  feature:	  It	  is	  the	  world-­‐accident	  for	  which	  becoming	  deity	  had	  waited	  and	  with	   which	   its	   prodigal	   stake	   begins	   to	   show	   signs	   of	   being	  redeemed.	  From	  the	  infinite	  swell	  of	  feeling,	  sensing,	  striving,	  and	  acting,	  which	  ever	  more	  varied	  and	   intense	  rises	  above	   the	  mute	  eddyings	   of	   matter,	   eternity	   gains	   strength,	   filling	   with	   content	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Among	  the	  theoretical	  difficulties	  of	  the	  traditional	  doctrine	  of	  creation,	  there	  is	   indeed	   the	   existence	   of	   evil.	   This	   issue	   becomes	   particularly	   delicate	   after	  Auschwitz,	   as	   brilliantly	   highlighted	   for	   instance	   by	   Grossman:	   “After	   all,	   it	   is	   not	  writers,	  poets	  or	  composers	  who	  created	  the	  soul	  of	  Eichmann	  …	  .	  It	  is	  not	  they	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  general	  senseless	  madness	  of	  the	  universe.	  We	  have	  the	  right	  to	   ask	   the	   divine	  mocker	   this	   question:	   in	  whose	   image	   and	   likeness	  was	   humanity	  created?	   In	   whose	   image	   were	   Hitler	   and	   Himmler	   created?	   It	   was	   not	   men	   and	  women	   who	   gave	   Eichmann	   his	   soul;	   men	   and	   women	   merely	   made	   an	  Obersturmbannführer’s	   uniform	   for	   him.	   And	   there	   were	   many	   other	   of	   God’s	  creations	   who	   covered	   their	   nakedness	   with	   the	   uniforms	   of	   generals	   and	   police	  chiefs,	  or	  with	   the	  silk	  shirts	  of	  executioners.	  We	  should	  call	  on	   the	  Creator	   to	  show	  more	  modesty.	  He	  created	  the	  world	  in	  a	  frenzy	  of	  excitement.	  Instead	  of	  revising	  his	  rough	   drafts,	   he	   had	   his	   work	   printed	   straightaway”	   (Grossman	   2013,	   pos.	   1008-­‐1016).	  25	   Jonas’	   narration	   is	   rooted	   into	   the	   Kabbalistic	   tradition	   and	   is	   to	   be	  understood	  as	  an	  innovation	  of	  the	  latter	  (Jonas	  1996,	  142).	  See	  Frogneux	  (2001,	  233-­‐242;	   Bonaldi,	   2007;	   Bongardt	   2008;	   Frogneux	   2011;	   Borghese	   Keene	   2014;	   Becchi-­‐Franzini	  Tibaldeo	  2014).	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after	  content	  of	  self-­‐affirmation,	  and	  the	  awakening	  God	  can	  first	  pronounce	  creation	  to	  be	  good	  (Jonas	  1966,	  275-­‐276).	  As	  we	  know,	  the	  essence	  of	  life	  is	  characterized	  by	  precariousness,	  instability,	  and	  vulnerability—in	  a	  word,	  mortality.	  But	  what	  the	  mythical	  account	  adds	  is	  the	  following	  remark:	  Yet	  it	   is	  precisely	  through	  the	  briefly	  snatched	  self-­‐feeling,	  doing,	  and	   suffering	   of	   finite	   individuals,	   with	   the	   pitch	   of	   awareness	  heightened	  by	  the	  very	  press	  of	  finitude,	  that	  the	  divine	  landscape	  bursts	   into	   color	   and	   the	   deity	   come	   to	   experience	   itself	   (Jonas	  1966,	  276).	  And	  the	  Deity’s	  self-­‐experience	  takes	  place	  with	  even	  more	  intensity	  thanks	  to	  the	  appearance,	  within	  the	  cosmic	  adventure,	  of	  mankind:	  And	  then	  he	  [God]	  trembles	  as	  the	  thrust	  of	  evolution,	  carried	  by	  its	  own	  momentum,	  passes	  the	  threshold	  where	  innocence	  ceases	  and	  an	  entirely	  new	  criterion	  of	  success	  and	  failure	  takes	  hold	  of	  the	   divine	   stake.	   The	   advent	   of	   man	   means	   the	   advent	   of	  knowledge	   and	   freedom,	   and	   with	   this	   supremely	   double-­‐edged	  gift	   the	   innocence	   of	   the	   mere	   subject	   of	   self-­‐fulfilling	   life	   has	  given	  way	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  responsibility	  under	  the	  disjunction	  of	  good	   and	   evil.	   To	   the	   promise	   and	   risk	   of	   this	   agency	   the	   divine	  cause,	   revealed	  at	   last,	  henceforth	   finds	   itself	   committed;	   and	   its	  issue	  trembles	  in	  the	  balance	  (Jonas	  1966,	  277).	  Therefore,	   Jonas’	  account	  of	  creation	  evidences	  that	  vulnerability	   is	  the	  basic	  feature	  not	   only	   of	   life,	   but	   also	   of	  God	  himself,	   and	   this	   is	   for	   the	   following	  reasons:	   the	   primeval	   self-­‐negation	   of	   God	   highlights	   his	   acceptance	   of	  vulnerability	   as	  his	   essence	   and	   fate.	   Indeed,	   due	   to	   this	   oblational	   decision,	  the	   Deity	   provides	   the	   ultimate	   foundation	   for	   the	   cosmic	   contingency	   and	  especially	  for	  the	  peculiar	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	   life.	  Moreover,	  God	  accepts	  to	  bind	  his	  own	  being	  to	  the	  cosmic	  adventures	  of	  evolution	  and,	  as	  soon	  as	  life	  appears,	  mortality.	  Due	  to	  his	  primeval	  self-­‐denial,	  he	  decides	  to	  put	  his	  own	  existence	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  cosmic	  adventure,	  and	  ultimately	  in	  the	  hands	   of	   human	   liberty.	   He	   is,	   indeed,	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   unforeseeable	  outcomes	  of	  these	  adventures,	  that	  are	  out	  of	  his	  control.	  He	  cannot	  but	  accept	  their	  openness	  and	  ambivalence,	  and	  this	  is	  precisely	  because	  he	  himself	  is	  at	  the	  origins	  of	  such	   features.	  The	  essential	   relationship	  between	  vulnerability	  and	  ambivalence	   is	  already	  highlighted	  by	   the	   “mortal”	  essence	  of	   life	   (see	  §	  3.1).	  However,	  the	  connection	  becomes	  even	  more	  manifest	  and	  dramatic	  due	  to	  mankind:	  it	  is,	  indeed,	  thanks	  to	  human	  beings	  that	  the	  cosmic	  opportunity	  offered	  by	  God	  can	  be	  “transfigured	  or	  possibly	  even	  disfigured”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  275).	  God	   is	  himself	  vulnerable,	   since	  his	  being	   is	  essentially	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  man:	  





The	   image	   of	   God,	   haltingly	   begun	   by	   the	   universe,	   for	   so	   long	  worked	   upon—and	   left	   undecided—in	   the	   wide	   and	   then	  narrowing	   spirals	   of	   pre-­‐human	   life,	   passes	   with	   this	   last	   twist,	  and	   with	   a	   dramatic	   quickening	   of	   the	   movement,	   into	   man’s	  precarious	   trust,	   to	   be	   completed,	   saved,	   or	   spoiled	   by	   what	   he	  will	  do	  to	  himself	  and	  the	  world	  (Jonas	  1966,	  277).	  What	  are	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  fresco	  for	  human	  liberty	  and	  responsibility?	  Jonas	  answers	  as	  follows:	  Having	   given	   himself	   whole	   to	   the	   becoming	   world,	   God	   has	   no	  more	   to	  give:	   it	   is	  man’s	  now	  to	  give	   to	  him.	  And	  he	  may	  give	  by	  seeing	   to	   it	   in	   the	  ways	  of	  his	   life	   that	   it	  does	  not	  happen,	  or	  not	  happen	   too	   often,	   and	   not	   on	   his	   account,	   that	   “it	   repented	   the	  Lord”	   (Gen.	   6:6-­‐7)	   to	   have	   made	   the	   world26	   (Jonas	   1966,	   279;	  Jonas	  1996,	  142).	  Then	   Jonas	   adds	   a	   statement	   that	   recalls	   Grossman’s	   belief	   in	   the	   existence	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  good:	  This	   may	   well	   be	   the	   secret	   of	   the	   »thirty-­‐six	   righteous	   ones«	  whom,	   according	   to	   Jewish	   tradition,	   the	   world	   shall	   never	   lack	  (Sanhedrin	  97	  b;	  Sukkah	  45	  b):	   that	  with	   the	  superior	  valency	  of	  good	  over	  evil,	  which,	  we	  hope,	  obtains	  in	  the	  non-­‐causal	   logic	  of	  things	   there,	   their	   hidden	   holiness	   can	   outweigh	   countless	   guilt,	  redress	  the	  balance	  of	  a	  generation	  and	  secure	  the	  serenity	  of	  the	  invisible	  realm	  (Jonas	  1966,	  279).	  And,	   similarly	   to	   Grossman,	   Jonas	   details	   further	   his	   reflections	   in	   order	   to	  secure	  his	  belief	   against	   the	  accusation	  of	  optimistic	   superficiality27.	   Jonas	   is	  aware	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   superiority	   of	   good	   over	   evil	   ought	   to	   cope	   with	  Auschwitz,	   namely	   with	   “the	   gassed	   and	   burnt	   children,”	   “the	   defaced,	  dehumanized	  phantoms	  of	  the	  camps”,	  and	  “all	  the	  other,	  numberless	  victims	  of	   the	   man-­‐made	   holocausts	   of	   our	   time”	   (Jonas	   1966,	   279).	   The	   Shoah	  undeniably	  casts	  a	  shadow	  of	  anxiety	  over	  the	  ambivalence	  of	  human	  liberty	  and	   responsibility.	   If—on	   the	   one	   hand—this	   is	   something	   perfectly	  consistent	   with	   the	   essence	   of	   freedom	   and	   with	   the	   overall	   open-­‐ended	  feature	  of	  the	  cosmic	  adventure	  (incidentally,	  this	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  pre-­‐emptively	  guaranteeing	  a	  happy	  ending	  to	  the	  latter),	  yet—on	  the	  other	  hand—the	   unheard	   of	   degree	   of	   ambivalence	   gained	   by	   present	   day	  humankind	  compels	  additional	  philosophical	  efforts	  and	  a	  renewed	  degree	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Jonas’	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  humanity	  that	  ought	  to	  help	  God	  rather	  than	  the	  converse	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  account	  of	  Etty	  Hillesum,	  a	  young	  Dutch	  Jewess	  who	  was	  murdered	  in	  Auschwitz	  (Jonas	  1996,	  191-­‐192;	  see	  also	  Hillesum	  2002).	  27	   Indeed,	   I	   believe	   that	   the	   following	   account	   provides	   a	   sound	   argument	   against	  Agamben’s	   objection	   to	   Jonas’	   conciliatory	   and	   optimistic	   theodicy	   (Agamben	   1999,	  20).	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awareness.	   Jonas	   proposes	   the	   following	   corollary	   to	   his	   tentative	  metaphysical	  account:	  the	   image	   of	   God	   is	   in	   danger	   as	   never	   before,	   and	   on	   most	  unequivocal,	   terrestrial	   terms.	   That	   in	   these	   terms	   an	   eternal	  issue	   is	   at	   stake	   together	  with	   the	   temporal	   one	   –	   this	   aspect	   of	  our	   responsibility	   can	   be	   our	   guard	   against	   the	   temptation	   of	  fatalistic	   acquiescence	   or	   the	   worse	   treason	   of	   après	   nous	   le	  
deluge.	  We	   literally	   hold	   in	   our	   faltering	   hands	   the	   future	   of	   the	  divine	   adventure	   and	   must	   not	   fail	   Him,	   even	   if	   we	   would	   fail	  ourselves.	   Thus	   in	   the	   dim	   light	   at	   the	   end	   of	   our	  wandering	  we	  may	   discern	   a	   twofold	   responsibility	   of	   man:	   one	   in	   terms	   of	  worldly	   causality,	   by	   which	   the	   effect	   of	   his	   deed	   extends	   for	  some	   greater	   or	   shorter	   length	   into	   a	   future	  where	   it	   eventually	  dissipates;	   and	   a	   simultaneous	   one	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   impact	   on	   the	  eternal	   realm,	   where	   it	   never	   dissipates	   …	   .	   Although	   the	  hereafter	   is	   not	   ours,	   nor	   eternal	   recurrence	   of	   the	  here,	  we	   can	  have	   immortality	   at	   heart	   when	   in	   our	   brief	   span	   we	   serve	   our	  threatened	   mortal	   affairs	   and	   help	   the	   suffering	   immortal	   God	  (Jonas	  1966,	  281).	  In	   conclusion,	   Jonas’	   view	   of	   human	   responsibility	   as	   a	   cooperative	   and	  empathetic	   effort	   with	   the	   immortal,	   impotent	   and	   suffering	   God	   is	   quite	  different	   from	   Grossman’s	   atheistic	   belief	   in	   the	   immortality	   of	   humanity.	  Indeed,	   I	   believe	   this	   dissimilarity	   is	   at	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   contrast	   between	  Grossman’s	   belief	   that	   evil	   and	   violence	   “will	   leave	   no	   trace”	   (Grossman	  2011b,	  pos.	  3084),	  and	  Jonas’	  opposite	  persuasion	  that	  human	  liberty	  has	  an	  “impact	   on	   the	   eternal	   realm,	   where	   it	   never	   dissipates”	   (Jonas	   1966,	   281).	  Nevertheless,	  both	  perspectives	  share	  strong	  similarities	  due	  to	  their	  common	  enquiry	  into	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Shoah	  and	  its	  consequences	  on	  issues,	  such	  as	  vulnerability,	  immortality,	  humanity,	  freedom	  and	  good.	  
4. The Human Condition after Auschwitz After	   having	   outlined	   Jonas’	   and	  Grossman’s	   views	  on	   the	  Shoah,	   along	  with	  their	  mutual	   similarities	   and	   differences,	  what	   I	   endeavour	   to	   carry	   out	   is	   a	  concluding	   critical	   enquiry.	   I	   wish	   to	   verify	   if	   Jonas’	   and	   Grossman’s	  reflections	  are	  somehow	  consistent	  with	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  relatively	  recent	  meditation	  on	  the	  Remnants	  of	  Auschwitz	   (Agamben	  1999).	  My	  analysis	  shall	  focus	  on	  two	  main	  questions	  that	  are	  indeed	  closely	  related	  one	  another:	  what	  does	   “human”	   signify	   after	   Auschwitz?	   And:	   What	   paradigm	   do	   Jonas	   and	  Grossman’s	  reflections	  on	  the	  Shoah	  embody?	  According	  to	  Agamben,	  Auschwitz’s	  “unsaid”	  relies	  on	  its	  unprecedented	  distinctiveness,	   which	   is	   expressed	   as	   follows:	   “the	   camp	   is	   the	   absolute	  verification	  of	  Nazi	  politics,	  which,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Goebbels,	  was	  precisely	  the	  ‘art	   of	  making	   possible	  what	   seems	   impossible’”	   (Agamben	   1999,	   77).	  What	  does	   this	   mean?	   In	   what	   sense	   does	   the	   Shoah	   represent	   the	   becoming	  





possible	  of	   something	  allegedly	   impossible?	  Agamben’s	  answer:	   “This	  means	  that	  humans	  bear	  within	  themselves	  the	  mark	  of	  the	  inhuman,	  that	  their	  spirit	  contains	   at	   its	   very	   center	   the	   wound	   of	   non-­‐spirit,	   non-­‐human	   chaos	  atrociously	  consigned	  to	  its	  own	  being	  capable	  of	  everything”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  77).	  The	  event	  of	  Auschwitz—and	  in	  particular	  the	  related	  metamorphosis	  of	  the	  prisoner	  into	  a	  dehumanised	  shadow,	  called	  in	  the	  jargon	  of	  the	  camp	  der	  
Muselmann,	   literally	   “the	   Muslim”28—“makes	   it	   forever	   impossible	   to	  distinguish	  between	  man	  and	  non-­‐man”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  47).	  The	  Muselmann	  is	   the	   embodiment	  of	   the	   infernal	  novelty	  of	  Auschwitz:	   he	   “is	   the	   site	  of	   an	  experiment	   in	   which	   morality	   and	   humanity	   themselves	   are	   called	   into	  question”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  63),	  and	  this	  precisely	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  enquiring	  into	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   Shoah	   and	   thinking	   after	   the	   Shoah	   requires	   to	  undergo	  a	  thorough	  conceptual	  revolution:	  Auschwitz	  marks	   the	   end	   and	   the	   ruin	   of	   every	   ethics	   of	   dignity	  and	   conformity	   to	   a	   norm.	   The	   bare	   life	   to	  which	   human	   beings	  were	  reduced	  neither	  demands	  nor	  conforms	  to	  anything.	  It	  itself	  is	   the	   only	   norm;	   it	   is	   absolutely	   immanent.	   And	   “the	   ultimate	  sentiment	   of	   belonging	   to	   the	   species”	   cannot	   in	   any	   sense	   be	   a	  kind	   of	   dignity.	   The	   good	   that	   the	   survivors	   were	   able	   to	   save	  from	   the	   camp—if	   there	   is	   any	   sense	   in	   speaking	   of	   a	   “good”	  here—is	   therefore	   not	   dignity.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   atrocious	  news	  that	  the	  survivors	  carry	  from	  the	  camp	  to	  the	  land	  of	  human	  beings	   is	  precisely	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   lose	  dignity	   and	  decency	  beyond	   imagination,	   that	   there	   is	   still	   life	   in	   the	   most	   extreme	  degradation.	   And	   this	   new	   knowledge	   now	   becomes	   the	  touchstone	   by	   which	   to	   judge	   and	   measure	   all	   morality	   and	   all	  dignity	  (Agamben	  1999,	  69).	  The	   immanence	   of	   “bare	   life”	   along	   with	   the	   paradox	   exemplified	   by	   the	  
Muselmann—namely	   the	   fact	   that	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  bare	   life	   is	  a	   condition	  of	  extreme	  dehumanisation	   and	  degradation,	  while	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   it	   is	   still	  life29—is	   Auschwitz’s	   main	   dreadful	   achievement.	   What	   does	   this	   mean?	  Before	  Auschwitz	  “human”	  life	  (bios)	  is	  generally	  understood	  as	  manifesting	  a	  thorough	  differentia	  from	  natural	  or	  bare	  life	  (zoē)30.	  And	  those	  human	  efforts,	  such	   as	   ethics,	   law	   and	   politics,	   that	   aim	   at	   identifying	   and	   ruling	   human	  nature,	  presuppose	  that	  unequivocal	  differentia.	  But	  then	  Auschwitz	  modifies	  this	  framework	  deeply	  and	  forever.	  The	  Muselmann	  suggests	  precisely	  that	  the	  former	  definition	  of	   “human”	  as	  a	  bios	   (namely,	   a	   form	  of	   life	   endowed	  with	  specific	   features)	   as	   opposed	   to	   zoē	   is	   simply	   untenable.	   Moreover,	   the	  
Muselmann	  exhibits	  that	  the	  “human”	  comes	  close	  to	  conjoining	  with	  zoē,	  with	  all	   its	   paradox	   and	   ambivalence.	  Thanks	   to	   the	   testimony	  of	   the	  Muselmann,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  origin	  of	  the	  term	  is	  explained	  in	  Agamben	  (1999,	  44–45).	  29	   “The	  Muselmann	   is	   the	   non-­‐human	  who	   obstinately	   appears	   as	   human;	   he	   is	   the	  human	  that	  cannot	  be	  told	  apart	  from	  the	  inhuman”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  81–82).	  30	  The	  difference	  between	  bios	  and	  zoē	  is	  elucidated	  in	  Agamben	  (1998).	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after	   the	  Shoah	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	   restore	   the	  previous	   theoretical	  belief	   in	  the	   plain	   differentia	   of	   man.	   This,	   however,	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   human	  being	  ought	  to	  utterly	  get	  rid	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  specificity,	  but	  that	  the	  latter	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  light	  of	  its	  dialectical,	  paradoxical	  and	  ambivalent	  relationship	   with	   “bare	   life”.	   This	   is	   indeed	   the	   “lesson	   of	   Auschwitz”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  133)	  and	  its	  point	  of	  no	  return:	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  its	  view	  of	   the	   human	   being,	   Auschwitz	   revokes	   any	   abstract,	   fixed	   and	   clear	  demarcation	  between	  normality	   and	  exceptionality,	   possible	   and	   impossible,	  the	   ordinary	   and	   the	   extreme,	   humanity	   and	   inhumanity.	   Hence,	   any	  normative	   viz.	   ethical,	   political,	   or	   metaphysical	   feature	   insisting	   on	   the	  reciprocal	   unambiguous	   otherness	   of	   those	   opposites,	   becomes	   simply	  meaningless	   and	   finally	   fails	   to	   understand	   the	   very	   essence	   of	   the	   human	  being	  and	  finally	  the	  Shoah.	  According	  to	  Agamben,	  Auschwitz	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  following	  hermeneutical	  dispute: 
... it	   is	   possible	   to	   gage	   the	   insufficiency	   of	   the	   two	   opposed	  theses	   that	   divide	   accounts	   of	   Auschwitz:	   the	   view	   of	   humanist	  discourse,	   which	   states	   that	   “all	   human	   beings	   are	   human”	   and	  that	   of	   anti-­‐humanist	   discourse,	   which	   holds	   that	   “only	   some	  human	   beings	   are	   human.”	   What	   testimony	   says	   is	   something	  completely	   different,	   which	   can	   be	   formulated	   in	   the	   following	  theses:	  “human	  beings	  are	  human	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  not	  human”	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  “human	  beings	  are	  human	  insofar	  as	  they	  bear	  witness	  to	  the	  inhuman”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  121).	  So	  what	  is	  the	  human	  being	  after	  all?	  What	  remains	  of	  the	  human	  being	  after	  Auschwitz?	  And	  what	  about	  its	  future?	  Agamben	  is	  ultimately	  persuaded	  that	  “it	  is	  truly	  not	  possible	  to	  destroy	  the	  human”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  133-­‐134),	  and	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  very	  specificity	  of	  the	  human	  being	  –	  that	  is,	  his	  or	  her	  own	  paradoxical	  and	  ambivalent	  feature:	  The	  human	  being	  can	  survive	   the	  human	  being,	   the	  human	  being	  is	   what	   remains	   after	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   not	  because	  somewhere	  there	   is	  a	  human	  essence	  to	  be	  destroyed	  or	  saved,	  but	  because	  the	  place	  of	  the	  human	  is	  divided,	  because	  the	  human	   being	   exists	   in	   the	   fracture	   between	   the	   living	   being	   and	  the	  speaking	  being,	  the	  inhuman	  and	  the	  human	  (Agamben	  1999,	  134).	  In	  other	  words,	  “the	  human	  being	  is	  a	  potential	  being”	  (Agamben	  1999,	  134),	  whose	   deeds	   and	   achievements	   are	   characterised	   by	   ambivalence	   and	  uncertainty—that	   is,	   by	   the	   unavoidable	   twofold	   possibility	   of	   achieving	  humanity	   against	   inhumanity	   (that	   is,	   preserving	   the	   fracture	   or	   differentia	  between	   the	   human	   and	   the	   inhuman)	   or	   reducing	   humanity	   to	   inhumanity	  (that	  is,	  getting	  rid	  of	  the	  fracture).	  By	  the	  way,	  what	  ambivalence	  additionally	  means	  is	  precisely	  that	  choosing	  one	  alternative	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  definitive	  vanishing	  of	  the	  other,	  but	  only	  its	  provisional	  relegation	  to	  the	  background	  of	  





sheer	   possibility.	   And	   this	   is	   where	   human	   ambivalence	   and	   vulnerability	  cross:	   no	   matter	   how	   good	   or	   evil,	   any	   deed	   is	   always	   unsecure	   and	  provisional,	   since	   it	   is	   intrinsically	  vulnerable	   to	   its	  opposite:	  good	   is	  always	  exposed	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  evil,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  What	  in	  particular	  Auschwitz	  emphasises,	  is	  that	  when	  humanity	  is	  likely	  to	   be	   reduced	   to	   inhumanity,	   two	  main	   results	   follow:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  human	  ambiguity	  nurtures	  evil	  and	  discharges	  dreadful	  effects	  on	  those,	  who	  become	  the	  persecuted	  and	  undergo	  extermination;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  thanks	  precisely	  to	  those	  vulnerable	  persecuted,	  who	  bear	  testimony	  to	  the	  atrocity,	  something	   of	   the	   human	   always	   remains,	   and	   this	   highlights	   an	   additional	  connection	  between	  the	  paradox	  of	  human	  ambivalence	  and	  vulnerability.	  I	   believe	   Jonas’	   and	  Grossman’s	   reflections	  on	   the	  Shoah	   are	   thoroughly	  consistent	   with	   these	   profound	   meditations	   by	   Agamben.	   First,	   Jonas	   and	  Grossman	  succeed	  in	  highlighting	  the	  essential	  vulnerability	  and	  ambivalence	  viz.	   the	  fracture	  that	  characterises	  human	  freedom.	  This	  not	  only	  means	  that	  human	   liberty	   can	   turn	   to	  good	  or	  evil,	  but	  also	   that	   there	   is	  no	  way	  of	  pre-­‐emptively	   securing	   liberty	   against	   risks	   such	   as	   (self-­‐)destruction,	  degradation,	   etc.	   And	   of	   course,	   due	   to	   the	   achievements	   of	   present	   day	  technology,	   the	  occurrence	  of	   such	   risks	   is	   far	  more	   than	   a	  mere	   theoretical	  possibility.	   Second,	   Jonas	   and	   Grossman	   face	   the	   similar	   challenge	   of	  reshaping	   their	   faith	   in	   humanity	   after	   the	   event	   of	   Auschwitz.	   Their	  intellectual	   itinerary	   witnesses	   this	   very	   effort,	   along	   with	   their	   personal	  involvement	   in	   the	   investigated	   matter.	   For	   both,	   the	   Shoah	   represents	   the	  crucial	  test	  to	  their	  reflections	  on	  human	  nature	  and	  the	  decisive	  proof	  of	  the	  inadequacy	   of	   a	   certain	   theoretical	   attitude,	   namely	   the	   one	   fostering	   an	  abstract	   and	   one–sided	   view	   of	   the	   human	   being.	   In	   this	   respect,	   Jonas	   and	  Grossman	   have	   to	   carry	   out	   different	   tasks:	   Jonas,	   who	   does	   not	   want	   to	  relinquish	   the	   idea	   of	   transcendence,	   undertakes	   a	   thorough	   and	   innovative	  rehabilitation	  of	  the	  latter	  that	  ends	  in	  de–potentiating	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  God,	  abandoning	   its	   traditional	   omnipotence	   and	   almightiness,	   while	   incredibly	  enhancing	   the	   ambivalent	  prerogative	  of	   human	   freedom	  and	   responsibility;	  instead	   Grossman,	   who	   preliminarily	   opts	   for	   an	   immanent	   perspective	   on	  humanity,	  has	  to	  enquire	  whether	  his	  abjuration	  of	  Soviet	  Communism	  affects	  his	   faith	   in	   humanity,	   and	   pays	   a	   fee	   in	   terms	   of	   personal	   sufferings	   and	  tribulations	  (he	  finally	  pays	  with	  his	  life)	  in	  order	  to	  corroborate	  it.	  The	  result	  is	   a	   fragile	   but	   invincible	   faith	   in	   humanity,	   one	   that	   succeeds	   in	   bearing	  witness	  to	  inhuman	  times.	  For	   these	   reasons,	   I	   believe	   that	   Jonas’	   and	   Grossman’s	   reflections	   on	  Auschwitz	  belong	  neither	  to	  the	  humanist,	  nor	  the	  anti-­‐humanist	  perspective,	  but	   to	   the	  one	   focusing	  on	   the	  paradoxical	   fracture	  within	   the	  human	  being,	  and	   on	   the	   unforeseeable,	   vulnerable,	   and	   ambivalent	   viz.	   double-­‐faced	  character	  of	  all	  that	  is	  human.	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5. Concluding Remarks In	  this	  article	  I	  endeavoured	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  thinking	  of	  two	  authors	  of	  Jewish	  origins:	   the	   philosopher,	   Hans	   Jonas,	   and	   the	   writer,	   Vasily	   Grossman.	   In	  particular,	   I	   was	   interested	   in	   highlighting	   their	   contribution	   to	   the	  understanding	   of	   the	   Shoah.	   So,	   after	   a	   biographical	   outline	   I	   analysed	   how	  Jonas’	  and	  Grossman’s	  works	  cope	  with	  the	  evil	  of	  Auschwitz,	  which	  indirectly	  hit	   them	   both	   (their	  mothers	   were	   exterminated	   by	   the	   Nazis	   in	   Auschwitz	  and	   Berdichev	   respectively).	   After	   an	   enquiry	   into	   the	   uniqueness	   of	  Auschwitz’s	   evil,	   I	   focused	   on	   issues	   such	   as	   vulnerability,	   freedom,	  immortality,	   and	   humanity,	   and	   I	   tried	   to	   point	   out	   the	   analogies	   and	  differences	  between	  the	  works	  of	  the	  two	  authors.	  Among	  the	  affinities,	  I	  tried	  to	  single	  out	  the	  essential	  ambivalence	  of	  human	  nature,	  an	  ambivalence	  that	  characterises	   human	   liberty	   in	   a	   peculiar	   way:	   both	   Jonas	   and	   Grossman	  emphasise	  that	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  Shoah	  requires	  them	  to	  reframe	  the	  fabric	   of	   their	   concepts,	   including	   personal	   freedom,	   and	   their	   idea	   of	  humanity.	   The	   latter	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   interpreted	   as	   something	   simply	  transcending	   history,	   or	   as	   untouched	   by	   immorality,	   wickedness,	   and	  inhumanity.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   Auschwitz	   undermines	   the	   utter	  distinguishability	  of	  good	  from	  bad,	  and	  humanity	  from	  inhumanity.	  And	  yet	  –	  state	  both	  Jonas	  and	  Grossman—it	   is	  possible	  to	  preserve	  belief	   in	  humanity	  and	  in	  the	  good.	  This	  suggestion	  is	  not	  only	  one	  of	  the	  main	  achievements	  of	  Hans	  Jonas’	  and	  Vasily	  Grossman’s	  reflections,	  but—as	  I	  tried	  to	  underline	  in	  the	   last	   paragraph—is	   also	   consistent	   with	   Giorgio	   Agamben’s	   recent	   and	  relevant	  contribution	  to	  the	  topic.	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Abstract.	  The	  article	  endeavours	   to	  compare	   the	   reflections	  on	   the	  Shoah	   of	  two	  of	   the	  most	  celebrated	   intellectuals	  of	   Jewish	  origin	  of	   the	  20th	  century,	  namely	   the	   German	   philosopher	   Hans	   Jonas	   (1903-­‐1993)	   and	   the	   Soviet	  writer	  Vasily	  Grossman	  (1905-­‐1964).	  Both	  Jonas’	  essay	  on	  The	  Concept	  of	  God	  
after	  Auschwitz	  (1987)	  and	  Grossman’s	  novels	  and	  reports,	  such	  as	  The	  Hell	  of	  
Treblinka	   (1944),	  Life	  and	  Fate	   (1980),	   and	  The	  Sistine	  Madonna	   (1989),	   are	  characterised	   by	   a	   thorough	   enquiry	   into	   the	   ambivalence	   of	   the	   human	  condition,	   that	   tries	   to	  shed	  some	   light	  on	   the	  disturbing	  abyss	  of	  Auschwitz	  and	   the	  Shoah.	  Although	  neither	   Jonas	  nor	  Grossman	   considered	   themselves	  as	  religious	  believers,	  thanks	  to	  the	  Shoah	  they	  recollected	  their	  Jewish	  roots	  and	   developed	   peculiar	   and	   innovative	   thoughts	   on	   the	   meaning	   and	  vulnerability	   of	   life,	   human	   freedom,	   immortality,	   and	   God.	   The	   article	  endeavours	   to	   highlight	   the	  main	   similarities	   and	  differences	   between	   these	  two	  authors,	  who	  tackled	  the	  issue	  of	  thinking	  after	  Auschwitz.	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